Page 237 - Towards_a_New_Malaysia_The_2018_Election_and_Its_6146371_(z-lib.org)
P. 237

222                                                 Wong Chin Huat

                     Unlike malapportionment, gerrymandering cannot be mathematically
                  identi ed, as there is no universal rule on how constituency boundaries
                  should be drawn. Prevention of gerrymandering then rests on how e ectively
                  criteria and constraints tie the hands of gerrymanderers. Some systems place
                  restrictions on the shape of constituencies, mandating that they be contiguous
                  and compact. Others underline the importance of common interests;
                  administrative, sociocultural, and economic linkages; or natural boundaries—
                  but these systems cannot perfectly rule out gerrymandering if proposed
                  boundaries satisfy imposed criteria.
                     Section 2(d) of the  irteenth Schedule of Malaysia’s Constitution calls for
                  ‘regard’ for ‘the inconveniences attendant on alterations of constituencies and
                  to the maintenance of local ties’, without further de ning ‘inconveniences’
                  or ‘local ties’.  e EC o cially acknowledges administrative, infrastructural,
                  and natural boundaries as legitimate constraints but has had no qualms about
                  ignoring them. Despite the abrogation of local elections since 1965, local
                  councils’ policies colour local life and shape ‘communities of interests’. Logically,
                  single-council constituencies are representationally and administratively
                  superior to constituencies that span across local authorities, but the EC has
                  arbitrarily carved out many parliamentary and state constituencies containing
                  fragments of municipalities and districts.  e worst case is the parliamentary
                  constituency of Sungai Buloh, Selangor, which spans across four local
                  authorities: Selayang, Petaling Jaya, Shah Alam, and Kuala Selangor.
                     Gerrymandering renders boundaries often arbitrary even for constituencies
                  carved out from a single local council. Perak’s Manjung municipal council
                  area was divided into two parliamentary constituencies: Lumut and Beruas.
                  In 2013, the opposition won Beruas with a margin of 5,057 votes and Lumut
                  with 8,168 votes. Within Lumut, the opposition carried a state constituency,
                  Sitiawan, with a whopping 12,220-vote margin.  e township of Sitiawan
                  is about 30 minutes east of Lumut town and 45 minutes south of Beruas
                  town. In term of socioeconomic ties, Sitiawan is closer to coastal Lumut
                  than to inland Beruas.  e latest delimitation exercise, however, moved
                  Sitiawan (renamed Astaka, with slightly revised boundaries) from Lumut
                  to Beruas (Map 11.1). Unmistakably, the EC hoped to crack Lumut and
                  to pack Beruas, making it a PH super-stronghold.  anks to the anti-BN
                  electoral surge, PH carried Beruas with a margin of 27,954 votes (greater
                  than the 17,000-lead gerrymandering granted), and managed to narrowly
                  retain Lumut with a margin of  400 (overturning the  4,000-vote de cit
                  gerrymandering caused).








                        This content downloaded from 139.80.253.0 on Fri, 06 Nov 2020 04:22:39 UTC
                                   All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242