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38 Ibrahim Su an and Lee Tai De

Conclusion

Voting patterns in GE14 were complex; despite the prominence of communal
explanations among pundits and media, ethnicity alone is insu cient to
explain the BN’s decline in support. e electorate is multipolar in its partisan
leanings, and these patterns are not uniform nationwide. For instance, BN lost
further support among young voters in 2018 compared to 2013 across ethnic
groups, holding on to just 27 per cent of these votes versus 45 per cent in 2013.
PH captured about 45 per cent of the youth vote nationwide and had a clear
following among younger voters across Malaysia, with the exception of Malay
voters in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu, as well as the Malay/Melanau
community in Sarawak. On the east coast, PAS captured the majority of Malay
youth votes in Kelantan and Terengganu, despite multicorner contests.
Meanwhile, the three-way split in Malay votes on the west coast of
Peninsular Malaysia allowed PH to sweep nearly all mixed-ethnicity and low-
Malay-majority districts across Peninsular Malaysia. While, with the exception
of elderly Malays, voters uniformly rejected BN in Peninsular Malaysia,
support for PH among Malay voters was strong only on the west coast, from
southern Kedah to Johor. In other parts of Peninsular Malaysia, PAS emerged
as the preferred party among Malay voters.
Although in retreat on the west coast of the peninsula, PAS has consolidated
its strength through solid gains in the Malay-dominant parts of Kedah and
Pahang, as well as in Kelantan and Terengganu. e Islamist party has emerged
as the dominant party among Malay voters in the Malay-belt states. In these
states, PAS has a majority following among younger Malay voters.
Support for BN has collapsed in Peninsular Malaysia, except in over 80 per
cent-Malay districts. e former ruling coalition has been nearly unanimously
rejected by minority voters as well as by younger Malay voters. However, BN
continues to hold pluralities or small majorities in interior, rural Malay districts
in Peninsular Malaysia and some Muslim Bumiputera districts in Sabah. e
loss of government power will weaken the party’s hold on such areas, which in
the past, was aided by patronage and channelling public projects.
Sabah ceased to be a ‘safe-deposit’ state for BN with the collapse of support
from Muslim Bumiputera voters. While support from the KDM and ethnic-
Chinese communities had already been eroding for the past decade, the split
within UMNO Sabah caused the remaining Muslim Bumiputera vote to shift
towards local strongman Sha e Apdal, his party Warisan, and allies in PH.
In Sarawak, BN’s other former ‘safe-deposit’ state stands in a precarious
balance after the largely non-Muslim Dayak vote-bank shifted signi cantly

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