Page 34 - NAVAL SCIENCE 3 TEXTBOOK

SEA POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY 39

Revolutionary War

Revolutionary war can take a number of different forms. Today,
it often involves a conspiracy, culminating in a coup, that overturns
an established government. Few people actually arc involved, and
little is changed but the leadership. In times past, it took the form
seen in the United States in 1776, and in mllch of South America
in the early nineteenth century: a colonial war tor independence
from a mother COlilltl')', with opposing armed forces engaged ill
traditional warfare, ending with a formal treaty of peace and rec-
ognition of sovereignty. The French and Russian Revolutions. in
contrOlst, were explosive upheavals of the masses. They turned out
the old royalty and then consolidated the unexpected victories by
means of infighting among various revolutionary groups until one
dominant group emerged.
Revolutionary war basically involves efforts to seize political
power by force of arms, dcstro)1ing the existing government of a
country and possibly its political, social, and economic structures
in the process. Such warfare today is carried on in most cases by
An Osama bin Laden propaganda poster recovered by Navy SEALs
military insurrection or insurgency fostered by dissident clements
in an abandoned al Qaeda classroom in Afghanistan during the early
among the population. These revolutions are often called wars of days of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001.
nntionalliberation or people's wars, and thc}1 have been numerous
in the emerging nations of Africa and Asia since \,Vorld \Var II.
From the standpoint of its perpetrators, revolution is total war. frictiolls. If, in addition to these circumstances, corruption in gov-
The philosophy of such revolution, as expressed by Mao Tse-tung, ernillent or social and economic injustices are widespread, the sit-
is brutal: "Ail}' and all means are justified to attain desired ends, uation is ripe for revolution.
without regard for stupid scruples about benevolence, righteous- The second prerequisite for all)' revolution is an eillotional
ncss, and morality." Cil USC, one worth dyillg for. It IllUSt have broad appeal and be
Such revolutionary wars are primarily political and social pro- vague enough so it can be interpreted to each person's satisfac-
cesses rather than milita!,)' operations. Insurgent actions steadily tion. It does not have to be realistic or even attainable. Patriotic
weaken popular support, the national ecollomy, and the interna- and nationalistic causes such as freedom from oppression, human
tional status of that government. The military leadership is dis- rights, equal opportunity, and self-determination can stimulate
credited, for it cannot suppress insurgent actions everywhere at the illltlgination of anyone, especially those who feel an)' change
once; morale in the government forces drops as the situation dete- will better their own lot.
riorates. At every retreat, the insurgents advance; at ever), loss, the Finally, the insurgents Illust be organized and directed by
strength of the revolution increases. By the time the COllP de grace a closely knit group of clever leaders skilled in mobilizing and
(morttll stroke) is administered, little resistance is left. manipulating people. One of the first steps is the establishment of
a subversive shadow government. This group constantly vies with
Prerequisites for Revolution the legal government to undermine its control and continually
purges weaker elements ti'om its own membership.
There are three prerequisites tor a successful revolution: dis-
A classic example of these prerequisites was the rise to power
satisfaction with the status qllO, a calise, and a carefully directed
of the Taliban in AfghanistilI1 following the defeat of Soviet forces
organization.
there in the late 19805. They took advantage of the disarmy of the
Insurgent revolutions Illost often occur in underdevelopcd
legitimate government following the Soviet withdrawal, arms and
countries where slowly improving economies create expand-
money supplied by the \-Vest and Osama bin l.aden during the
ing gaps between those in power and the Illtljority of the people.
conflict, and religious zealotry among a slllall segment of the pop-
Zcalots often surface in sllch societies. where rising expectations
ulation to secure control of the collntry by 1998. Once in power,
breed impatience and dissatjsf~lCtion. Friction develops because
they imposed all manner of restrictions on the populace, especially
of communication gaps between rich ,lI1d poor, young and old,
women, which led to the collntry gaining a reputation as one of
peasants and small businessmen, bureaucrats and the public, eth-
the most oppressive regimes in the world by the end of the 1990s.
nic groups. and religious groups. The insurgents can exploit these
They remained ill control of the count!')' until their harboring of