Page 33 - NAVAL SCIENCE 3 TEXTBOOK

38 NAVAL KNOWI.EDGE

Irrational <1cts can never be discounted. The danger is not i.lI1d future limited wars can be deterred from ever starting. Eilch
so much the possible mental breakdown or a leader as that lead- argument poses a strategic dilemma.
er's consideration of tot<1l1)' illogical, uIlwarranted, or unrealistic The usc of chemical and biological agents poses the same kind
approaches to a problem. \"'hen considering this possibility, one of problems for stmtegists dealing with limited wal'.
must be aware of cultural difterences behvcen peoples. For instance, Careful target selection also is an important '~lCtor in limit-
Americans generally place a high value on human lire. This is not ing the scope and intensity of war. All manner of limitations and
necessarily the case in other cultures or countries. As recent history understandings can be imposed. The Vietnilm \'Var was a classic
has showIl, there will probably always be individuals, groups, and example of target limitation imposed by political leaders. At one
even Il .. 1tions that are willing to sacrifice innocent lives for political time, few targets other than enemy troops, armored vehicles, and
or economic g<.lins, or to advance extremist ideologies. logistics in transit could be struck by U.S. Nav)' and Air Force air-
craft. J'\'lany important facilities essential to the North Vietnamese
Limited War war eA-ext, such ilS bridges, ports, rail yards, and industrial areas,
This falls beh\'een the e:\:tremes of gcneml war and the so- were exempt. Haiphong Harbor \\' .. IS restricted both from aerial
called cold war. The previous section discussed the totality of attack and the laying of mines until the very end, enabling mas-
nuclear general war; cold war, in which all measures short of sive quantities of war equipment to be delivered without haz-
armed combat are used to attain national objectives, is the other ard. Politicill, not milltil!')" prohibitions prev;:li1ed in the effort to
ex1reme. Lill/ited war is defined ilS "armed encounters, other than limit the war. According to many analysts, the Vietnam \-Var was
incidents, in which one or more major powers or their proxies vol- lost largely because of these limitations. \'Vould it have been won
untarily restrict their actions in order to prevent escalation to gen- if these constrilints had been removed, or would such actions have
eral war." A proxy II'(/r is a form of limited war in which a major escillated the war, perhaps involving other nuclear powers? No one
will ever know.
power avoids direct military involvement b)' having satellite states
engage another major power or its allies. Limitations as to type, number, roles, and origins of mili-
These limitations or restrictions <Ire seldom aAected by formal tary forces can also anect a war. Defensive, support, and advisof)'
agreements. They usually result frolll understandings that are COll- troops arc less provocative than major combat elements. Proxy
veyed by means other than direct diplomatic meetings. The under- forces ;:1Void major power confrontations. Forces from alliances or
standings milY be made known through <l speech of the chief of the United Nations are often less objectionable than those from
state, official releases to the media, or perhaps an exchange of notes individual states. Use of naval and air power is less risk'y than an
through diplomatic channels in third countries. Interpretation of invilsion by ground rorces, which immediatel}' implies more than
the rules that limit operations may be rather broad, but c1ead}' the a temporary presence. All of these factors figured into the lim-
intent is to pre\'ent escalation to nuclear warfare. ited wars fought in Korea ilnd Vietnam. Soviet troops never actu-
\Vars may be limited in a number of ways, sllch as b}' limiting aUy participated in either war. The Chinese insisted their forces
objectives, arms, targets, forces, or geogrnphic operations. Limiting in Korea were all volunteers, despite the obviolls fiction of that
objectives is usually avoided, so restraints most often i.nvolve claim. Thc ':1Ct that UN forces fought in Korea against the Chinese
meallS, not ends. For eX<lmple, the U.S. national security objec- "volunteers" tended to reduce the impact of the cold fact that the
tive in Korea- the containment of communism- was successfully United States was in reality at war with China.
Geographic limitations are inherent in limited W'lI'. The are;:1
attained, but the secondary goal of unifying Korea was abandoned.
of conflict is mostly restricted to a relatively slllall region, or i.l sin-
The object in limited war is to select goals that avoid the appear-
ance of directly endangering the enemy power's vital interests. gle countfy. Additionall}', there often arc safe havens that are left
In any war, arms limitations, particularly limitations of nuclear alone. In the Korean \,Var, ror instance, Chinese staging areas across
weapons, are controversial. .Most civilized people agree that stm- the Yalu River were constantly under observation by U.S. recoll-
tegic nuclear bombardment of population centers should be naissance planes but were completely immune rrom an}' Uni ted
avoided, but what about the use of smillieI' tactical nuclear weap- Niltions attack. During the Vietnam \-Var, the Communists had a
ons designed specifically for battlefield use or the destruction of safe haven in Cambodia for ),C'l1'S in the Parrot's 13eak, a portion of
enemy missile silos? Argument against their use is centered on the land projecting deep into South Vietnal11 near Saigon. Allied forces
were prohibited from advancing toward Baghdad in the 199 1 Gulf
probability that oncc introduced for any purpose, both the size and
\'Var, and al Q"leda ilild the surviving Arghan Taliban have found
extent of their use could rapidly escalate. An opposite contention
is that tactical nuclear weapons should be used in limited war sit~ sanctuary for ),e .. trs in the mountainolls terrain along the Pakistan-
uations "in the overall best interest of humanity ilnd civilization." Afghanistan border following the U.S. im'asion of Afglwnistan
The argument here is that if they are used once or twice all the in 2001.
right targets at the right time, further aggression Cil ll be stopped