Page 31 - NAVAL SCIENCE 3 TEXTBOOK
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36       NAVA L  KNOWLEDGE

           Capabilities means the ability of a sl.lle 10 satisfy  its objectives   them)  must be taken  in  order to  I1lnke  best  usc of the available
        or to slop others from  threlltenillg  it~ill  pellce IlS  well  as  in war.   resources, be they economic.  milit<lr),. or other. '10 do this intelli-
        TheY;:1re  the Slim  total of J1lltional  power: political. mililllry. eco-  gentl)', the plmiller must be well informed and nlert to (til)' possible
        nomic,  social. scientific.  technological, psychological. moral, Ilnd   negative efitxts on the overall grand strategy.
        geographic.  Capabilities are only useful  when combined with  the
        meallS of applying that power eftectively.
                                                               Principles of War
           lI/tellfiollS  concern  a  state's  determination  to  execute  cer-
        tain  plnl1s.  Intentions  are  subjecti,'e  and  often  easily concealed.   If allllleasures short of war 1~1i1.  <lnd  wnr comes,  there Ilre certain
        They nre  shnped  by  interests,  objectives. policies.  principles,  and   principles  that have  evolved  over  the  centuries  that  govern  Wilr-
        commitments,  many  of which  may  be  unknown  to  outsiders.   fighting stmtegy and tactics. The}!  have  been  used  b)' all  sllccess-
        Determining the  intentions of a  potential  adversnry  is extremely   ful  military cOlllmanders. both (nmous ,md  infill110us. since bib-
        difllcliit. An  adversa ry's  probable course of action, however, Illust   lical  times.  including  Hannibal.  Julius  Caesar,  Napoleon,  Lord
        ;:llw;\)'s  be  considered  in  determining onc's  own  best strlltegy.  A   Nelson. Grant, Eisenhower, Nimitz, and Schw<lrlkopf. to name just
        rule of thumb is generally applied: the best indication of intentions   "few.lakcn together. these ore c"lied the prillciples ofll'lIr. The)' are
        is  nut what people say, but rather what they do.      as follows:
            Vllillerabilities me the weaknesses of a nation, which, if struck
                                                                  Define the objective. Evcf)' militaql operation should be
        by Ilily Ilction or means. will reduce the war potential, combll! dice-
                                                                  directed toward a c1enrly defined. decisive. and attainable
        tiveness. or nationlll will of that nation. Nations' vulnerabilities dif-
                                                                  objective. ''''hether the objective is destro)'ing an enemy's
        fer: they Ill<ly include the e<lse of interdiction of key trnnsportntion
                                                                  <lnned forces or merel), disrupting the <lbilit)' to use forces
        routes,  the vulner<lbility  of major  industrial  centers,  dependence
                                                                  eA-rctively, the most significant prepamtion <l  commander can
        0 11  overseas imports of r<lW  materials or fuels,  weak or unpopulilr
                                                                  make is to express c1earl)' the objective of the operation to
        governments, and so forth. The list is extensive.
                                                                  subordinate commllndcrs.
           The illfelligcllce process is used to gain the information ne(es-
                                                                  Mass forces. Use strength against weakness. A force, even one
        sary to make estimates of the situation or threat th<lt might  t~lCe a
                                                                  smaller than ils <ldversary. call nchieve decisive rcsults when it
        nntion. Ontn  concerning capabilities.  intentions.  <lnd  vulnernbili-
                                                                  cuncentmtes or focuses its assets 0 11  defeating <In enemy's crit-
        ties  must flow  in  a never-ending stream to intelligence speci<llists.
                                                                  iC1l1  vulnerability.
        who Illust process. all<llrLe, and evaluate this information.
           They  arrive  at  iflfclligcllce estimates  th<lt  are  provided  to  the   Maneuver. PI<lce <In enem), in a position of dis<ldvantage
        decision-making  lellders.  This  evalullted,  integmted,  <lnd  inter-  through the use of speed and agility to gaiu ,.111 advant<lge in
        preted information required for the development of national sccu-  time and space relative to the enemy's vulnerabilities.
        rity objectives, policies. and plmls is called strategic intelligence.   Take the offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initilltive.
           The purpose of estimates is to forecast intentions. The stratc-  OA-ensive action allows the commander to set the terms and
        gic intelligence specialist has a greater chance for success than does   select the place of confrontntion. exploit vulnerabilities, and
        the combat intelligence officer. since the fonner h<ls more time to   seize opportunities from ullexpected developments.
        study and re<lch  conclusions concerning enemy cnp<lbilities, h<lb-  Economize force. Emplo)1 all comb<lt power available in the
        its. and vulnernbilities. Estimating intentions. however, is a dllnger-  most eftective wa), possible;  minimize (om bat power spent on
        ous occupation.  It  is so because  no one can positively  determine   secondary targets. A successfully coordinated strike at an ene-
        what  ilCtlJ<lll}'  is  in  the  minds  of potential  enemy le;:ldefs.  Wide   m)" s critical vulnembility can have far morc significance than
        background  knowledge,  wisdom,  experience,  and  judgment  arc   an attempt to attack all vulnerabilities <It  once.
        nccessaq', and e\'ell then the strategist must recognize that the best
                                                                  Achieve unity of command.  Ensure coordinllted effort for every
        intelligence estimators arc subject to error because they <lre human.
                                                                  objective under one responsible commander. \"'hether the
        Thrent evaluation is <l  difficult and vital process. but one 011 which
                                                                  responsibility involves a single independent unit or 11  complete
        every government and nation is dependent for survivnl.
                                                                  battle force, unity of command is achieved b)' assigning a sin-
           The strntegic  pl<lnner  must  <lssess  the  degree  of risk  associ-
                                                                  gle commander at every level of coml1land.
        ated wilh v<lfious possible courses of action that could be 1'1ken to
                                                                  Maintain simplicity. Avoid unnecess<lry complexit)1 in pre-
        achieve national objectives. This mellns, simply, the probability of
                                                                  paring. planning. and conducting military opemtions. The
        Sll(cess of a course of Ilction versus the stakes. The degree of risk is
                                                                  implementing orders lo r some of the most influential naval
        almost entirely .. 1 1ll.1Uer of judgment. Defeat and failure can resuit
                                                                  bllttles ever fought have been little more than a pamgraph.
        from  miscalculations such as overrating one's  OWI1  capabilities or
                                                                  Broad guidance, mther thall deti1iled <l nd ilwolved instruc-
        lIndermting those of the opposition. Sometimes  unavoidable en/-
                                                                  tions. promotes flexibility ;:md simplicity. Simple plans and
        cII/flter/  risks  (actions having some degree of risk associated  with
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