Page 32 - NAVAL SCIENCE 3 TEXTBOOK

SEA POWER AN D NATIONAL SEr.U RI'I'Y 37

clear direction promote understanding and minimize confu- endanger life ever)'where on Ei:lrth. Victory in such an event would
sion. For example, the operation order [or Operation Desert be hard to imagine IeI' either side, or, for that matter, for any of the
Stornl sUlllmarized the allied objectives in a single sentence: survivors on Earth.
"Attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command and General war on this scale, and with this potential, has no prec-
control; sever I raqi supply lines; destroy chemical, biological, edent in history. The risks are huge and probably overshadow an)'
and nuclcar c.1pability; destroy Republican Guard forces in the gains. There is almost no margin for strategic error. Therefore, fer
Kuwaiti theater; liberate Kuwait." the first time in history we now devote more mental energy to the
Achieve surprise. Strike an enemy at a timc or place or in a prevention of general war than to plans IeI' fighting such a war.
manner for which the enemy is unprepared. It is not essen- This, however, has not caused nations to give up ideas ofbecoming
tial that an enemy be taken completely unaware, only that the dominant powers in their regions, or in the world. Rather, the very
enemy becomes aware too late to react effectively. Concealing fact that the risks of war have grown larger enables a clever antago-
capabilities ilnd intentions by using covert techniques and tac- nist to gain strategic advantage by exploitation of the opponent's
tics provides the opportunity to achieve surprise. fear of these risks. Nuclear stalemate has not invalidated the use of
terce or changed sound strategic concepts. Just as in the past, calcu-
Maintain security. Never permit an encmy to acquire unex-
lated escalation of force is often used to attain political objectives.
pected advantage. Alert watchstanders, scouting forces, and
the use of electronic emission control all reduce vulnerability
Possible Causes of General War
to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.
There are six potential actions that might cause a general war
Interestingly, many of the toregoing principles are also appli-
to occur:
cable to activities other than warfare. such as various board games
like chess and athletic contests like football and soccer. Most suc- Deliberate initiation
cessful head coaches ill these and other sports arc well aware of Accidental initiation
these principles at either the conscious or intuitive level, and Ivliscalculation
employ them to good effect to win their games. I'l'l isunderstanding
Entanglement
Irrational acts
Modern Forms of Armed Conflict
Probably no sane leader would ever deliberately start a general
J n modern times. there Me three main forms that large-scale armed
WM, unless one of two preconditions existed: threat of destruction
connict might take. These are general war, limited war, and various
or assurance of victory. If a leader had positive evidence that his
kinds and degrees of revolutionary war. Each of these is discussed
or her country was about to be destroyed by a nuclear attack, that
in the following sections.
leader might think there was nothing to lose by launching one first.
Or if a country made a spectacular technological breakthrough that
General War
would make retaliation unlikely, the leader might consider that the
Gel/emf war is defined by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as risk would be 1:11' outweighed by potential gains. Rut because the
"armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources long-term effects of a nuclear war are so unknown and far-reach-
of the belligerents an: employed, and the national su"rvival of a ing, deliberate initiation of such a war seems unlikely as long as the
major belligerent is in jeopardy." potential victim maintains a credible military deterrent.
At one time, victory in sllch a war was considered to be worth The United States now has sllch preponderant military power
any privation. Speaking before the House of Commons in 1940 in that it is difficult to imagine how an opponent could envision
the darkest da),s of World War II, Winslon Churchill bravel)' said, overcoming it. Howe"er, proliferation of nuclear weapons or other
"You ask what is our aim? I can answer in one word: victory- weapons of mass destruction among unprincipled countries or
victoq' at all costs; victory in spite of all terror, victory however long terrorists could lead to general war through accident, miscalcula-
and hard the road may be, IeI' without victory, there is no survival." tion, or misunderstanding in the future.
Speaking of the Korean \Var in 1951 , General Douglas Conflicts resulting in entanglement of major powers arc alwi.l}'s
iv[acArthur sagel)' advised, "There is no substitute for victory." This il danger. \Vars can be touched off intentionally by a third cOllntry
is an easily understood statement, but one that might not be so or coalition for a variety of Illotives. Collective security systems,
easil)' understood today. pledges, and other involvements with nations constantly in con-
Victory in the context of the term general war, as it is now tlict with neighbors in areas vital to the major powers (such as
defined, might be vcr)' hollow indeed. A global siruggle wilh Ihe Israel and the Arab states ill the Middle Ei:lSt, India and Pakistan,
unrestricted use of mass destruction nuclear weapons would and the two Koreas) pose such dangers.