Page 72 - NS-2 Textbook
P. 72

THE  RISE  TO WORLD  POWER STATUS                                                                      65


        cleared the harbor mouth and before  they could fire  a   seagoing navy a necessity. The United States had become
        single torpedo.                                         a formidable naval power. But the new possessions in the
            Sampson, on the New  York,  steamed valiantly west-  Pacific posed many problems.
        ward to try to get into the battle but never made it. A bit-  Attempts to find solutions to  these problems would
        ter dispute later arose between him and Schley over who   dominate much of the U.S. Navy's thinking for the next
        deserved  credit  for  the  victory.  Schley  was  also  later   forty years. Most perplexing was the issue of how to de-
        roundly criticized for hls tardiness in blockading Santi-  fend  the Philippines against a  militaristic,  expansionist
        ago and his wrong-way hIm when Cervera emerged.         Japan.  Located  some  8,000  miles  from  the  U.s.  West
            The entire action took a little more than three hams.   Coast and only a few hundred miles from Japan, defense
        One American was killed and another wounded. Spanish    of the Philippine Islands would require naval superiority
        losses  were heavy,  over 300  killed  and  150  wounded,   in Far Eastern V\'aters.  This, in  turn, would require base
        with  1,800  captured,  including Admiral  Cervera.  The   facilities  in  the Pacific far  beyond anything the  United
        Spanish fleet had been annihilated by a  superior fleet,   States had in 1898. Thus, in addition to annexing Hawaii,
        despite the latter's tactical errors and surprisingly poor   early in 1899 the United States laid claim to Wake Island,
        marksmanship.                                           and later the same year it annexed part of the Samoa Is-
                                                                lands, including a fine harbor at Pago Pago. In the face of
                                                                growing  anti-imperialist  sentiment  at  home,  however,
                        END  OF THE WAR
                                                                that was as far as Congress could go.
        The Battle of Santiago de Cuba had given the American      Spain, having lost all her principal colonies, decided
        people  another  Fomth  of  July  victory.  In  only  two   to divest herself of all her remaining empire and concen-
        months, the u.s. Navy had destroyed the Spanish fleets   trate on domestic development.  In 1899  she put up for
        in both the Pacific and Caribbean. Santiago surrendered   sale all her remaining Pacific possessions-nearly a thou-
        its  22,000  troops  on 14  July  to  General Shafter,  after a   sand  islands.  The  United States  was  not interested,  so
        brief siege  assisted by long-range naval bombardment.   Germany acquired many of them, including several 10-
        An  expeditionary  force  was  sent  to  Puerto  Rico;  it   cated betw'een the United States and the Philippines.
        quickly overcame all resistance after capturing San Juan,
        the capital. American arms 'were victorious everywhere       THE  RISE TO WORLD-POWER STATUS
        by  the  end  of July,  and the  U.s.  Navy made plans  to
        cruise  against  the  Spanish mainland.  Before  that  hap-  The  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  saw  major
        pened the Spaniards sued for peace. The two countries   changes  in  the  world  balance  of  naval  power.  In the
        signed  a  peace  treaty  in Paris  on  10  December  1898.   United States, the recent victories over Spain had kindled
        Spain recognized the independence of Cuba and turned   a national pride in the Navy and helped convince Con-
        over  Puerto  Rico,  the  Philippines,  and  Guam  to  the   gress to accept as a national goal the building of a navy
        United States.                                         that would be second only to that of Great Britain. The
            Notwithstanding the U.S.  success in the war,  there   chief rivals of Britain and the United States soon became
        were several lessons learned from it. First, the war clearly   Germany and Japan.
        showed that American military and political leaders had    While Mahan had provided the basic philosophy for
        to understand the principles of naval warfare, as elabo-  the American rise to major power status in the years fol-
        rated by Mahan. Second, the American people had to un-  lowing the turn of the century, the forceful young leader
        derstand that to be effective, the Navy had to be a mobile   who made it all happen was Theodore Roosevelt.  Fol-
        seagoing  organization  supported from  overseas  bases.   lowing the war with Spain, he had rehIrned as a national
        Defense of American cities against attack was not an ob-  hero  and won the  governorship  of New York  in  1898.
        jective of the Navy. TIllid, it was clear that a sound am-  Two years later he was selected as President McKinley's
        phibious doctrine had to be developed and gunnery and   vice presidentialnuming mate. When McKinley was as-
        fire control techniques had to be improved. None of the   sassinated in 1901,  Roosevelt  asstuned  the  presidency.
        rather disorganized landings in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and   The  brash young  proponent of naval power who had
        the Philippines could have succeeded in the face of seri-  done  much  to  get  the  United  States  prepared for  war
        ous opposition. Gunnery at Manila Bay and Santiago de   with Spain four years earlier as assistant secretary of the
        Cuba proved  effective  only  against  old  ships  and un-  navy was now the youngest preSident in American his-
        trained crews.  As Mahan himself warned, "We  cannot   tory.  Roosevelt  had  always  been  openiy  enthusiastic
        expect ever again to have an enemy as entirely inept as   about the idea of a large navy. In 1890 he had publicly
        Spain showed herself to be."                           stated that the United States needed" a large navy, com-
            Probably the most important long-term consequence   posed not merely of cruisers, but containing also a full
        of  the  war  was  America's  fieV\'  overseas  enlpire.  The   proportion of powerful battleships able to meet those of
        United States now had territories and bases that made a   any other nation."
   67   68   69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77