Page 83 - NS-2 Textbook

76 MARITIME HISTORY

believed the Allies would not start convoys. And they ported neutrality. In late March, four American merchant
figured Allied antisubmarine tactics would not be suc- ships were sunk by U-boats without warning off the
cessful in combating the large number of improved Ger- British Isles. Wilson hesitated no longer. On 2 April he
man U-boats. They were to be proven wrong on each of sent his waf message to Congress, stating, I1The world
these assumptions. must be made safe for democracy .... The right is more
On 1 February 1917 the kaiser ordered his U-boat precious than peace." On 6 April Congress declared war
fleet to begin unrestricted submarine warfare in desig- on Germany.
nated "barred zones" in the eastern Mediterranean and
arOlmd Britain, France, and Italy. Any Allied or neutral
ships found in these areas were liable to be sunk without
THE CONVOY SYSTEM
warning. By the end of April, the Germans had sunk over
2 million tons of shipping, exceeding even their own es- Shortly before war was declared, President Wilson had
tinlates. Britain's economy and war industry were se- sent Rear Admiral William Sinls to London to confer
verely hurt. It quickly became clear that if the sinkings with the British. The ship on which he was traveling
continued at this rate, Britain would soon have to sur- struck a German mine near Liverpool and he carne
render. ashore among the survivors. He proceeded to London,
arriving a few days after the American declaration of
war. He immediately went into consultation with Admi-
ral Sir John Jellicoe, the first sea lord. Sims learned that
AMERICA DECLARES WAR
Britain ·was losing the ·war and would have to surrender
Top American naval officers had been strongly recom- by October if the U-boat sinkings could not be stopped.
mending that the Navy prepare for war ever since the Sims was very surprised that the British had not
European war started. There was powerful political op- started a convoy system to protect merchant shipping.
position to this from Secretary of the Navy Josephus This method of grouping merchantmen under destroyer
Daniels and from Congress, however. With Wilson's ap- escort had proven successful across the English Charmel.
proval, Secretary Daniels had refrained from making any But British admirals believed it unwise to btllch mer-
"var preparations during Wilson's first term in office, chant ships at sea, fearing collisions and claiming that
concentrating instead on in-house reforms. In 1916 destroyers should not be used for such a "defensive"
President Wilson had been reelected on a platform of role. A group of yotmger British naval officers, however,
staying out of the war. They felt that any buildup of had wanted to try the convoy. Sinls conferred with them
the fleet would be contrary to that pledge. The ship- and was convinced that the convoy concept would V\lork.
building program authorized in 1916 was plodding He went directly to the British prinle minister, David
along without a sense of urgency, and this was as Presi- Lloyd George, and strongly recommended that the con-
dent Wilson and Daniels wanted it. The Navy was espe- voy be tried. The prime minister agreed and directed the
cially weak in destroyers and other small antisubmarine admiralty to h'y it out.
patrol craft, but the battleship fleet was adequate tmder In the mea11time, Sims cabled President Wilson to
the circumstances. send every destroyer possible to Britain to help in anti-
American public opinion had swtmg strongly to the submarine warfare. The first destroyers arrived in May.
side of the Allies by the end of 1916, mainly because of By July, thirty-seven American destroyers were in Britain
Gernlan U-boat warfare and American civilian casual- assigned to antisubmarine ""ark, mostly escorting con-
ties. When Germany proclaimed its policy of unre- voys under British command.
stricted submarine warfare in Februmy 1917, President Sims was appointed commander, United States
Wilson severed diplomatic relations and ordered Anleri- Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. He concen-
can merchanhnen bound for the war zone to be arnled. trated on all aspects of antisubmarine warfare. He had to
In early March, British intelligence intercepted a se- convince the top officers in the U.S. Navy, and Josephus
cret German note to Mexico. In it, Germany's foreign sec- Daniels as well, about the value of the convoy. While the
retary, Arthur Zinunermann, tried to convince Mexico to British started convoys on 30 April at SinlS'S urging, it
join Germany in the event of war with the United States. took the U.s. Navy until July before it accepted the idea.
In return, Germany would help Mexico recover land it By that time the success of the convoy system had been
had relinquished to the United States after the Mexican proved in actual operations. Escorts of convoys sank
War, comprising the states of Texas, Arizona, and Nevv more U-boats than ever before/ convoys sailed without
Mexico. When the British revealed the contents of this collisions, and port schedules were greatly inlproved.
note to the U.S. government, it caused an uproar. All re- Convoys could sail on direct routes, not having to zigzag
maining support for the German cause in Washington to avoid U-boats. This saved both tinle and fuel. From
evaporated, even among those who had strongly sup- May onward, losses dropped steadily. Adoption of the