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8.0 REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND GUIDANCE equipment and operations for non-covered chemicals. One

The CSB reviewed various regulations from different agencies key provision of PSM is the PHA, which requires employees to
to determine their applicability to this incident. Regulations identify potential process risks and safeguards in place to mitigate
from two agencies, OSHA and PHMSA, are included in this hazards. In the most recent PHA for Mod B before the incident
Case Study for discussion. OSHA conducted and completed from March 2015, MGPI identified the potential for the wrong
an investigation that arose out of this incident. Many of the chemical to be transferred into the sodium hypochlorite bulk
violations for which OSHA cited MGPI and Harcros correspond tank due to operator error or a “bad shipment” of a chemical.
to the CSB’s investigation and findings. While other violations MGPI included mostly generic administrative safeguards,

are outside the scope of the CSB’s investigations in that they such as training and procedures, to prevent the transfer of a
involve chemicals other than 30% sulfuric acid and sodium wrong chemical; most of which failed to prevent or mitigate
hypochlorite, they are included here because they provide the October 2016 incident as described in this Case Study.
insight into a voluntary Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) conducted
by MGPI before the incident. As discussed, PHAs are required Following the incident, OSHA inspected MGPI for compliance with
under OSHA’s PSM standard; the one conducted by MGPI for the regulations that covered processes and activities involved in the
two chemicals involved in the incident, however, was voluntary incident, as well as the application of PSM for covered chemicals

because the chemicals are not covered under the standard. The at Mod B. OSHA also conducted a compliance inspection of
CSB also collaborated with and reviewed PHMSA regulations. Harcros in relation to all applicable requirements while at the
With respect to these, the CSB looked into PHMSA’s HMRs, as MGPI facility. On April 19, 2017, OSHA issued citations to MGPI
well as their history, and found them to be pertinent, particularly and Harcros for violations. Some of the violations issued to MGPI
so far as inadvertent mixing of incompatible materials is pertained to OSHA’s PSM standard and were covered under
concerned. Accordingly, the CSB reviewed the HMRs, as well OSHA’s National Emphasis Program (NEP) for PSM Covered
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as relevant PHMSA guidance, for connection to this incident. Chemical Facilities. As discussed in Section 5.3, one of the
PSM violations pertained to a PHA requirement for facility
8.1 OSHA siting, specifically regarding occupied structures including, but

Though OSHA does not have a specific standard for bulk not limited to, the control room inside the Mod B building.
unloading activities, it has a number of regulations that apply
to the safe handling of chemicals. For example, the OSHA The remaining OSHA violations included not having
Hazard Communication standard requires employers to provide adequate emergency exits in the Mod B control room;
employees with effective communication and training on violating requirements for emergency action plans, as MGPI
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hazardous materials handled or stored in the workplace. This operators were unable to retrieve respirators per the written
includes chemical properties, such as reactivity, and measures plan; and not providing employees with the required hazard

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for employees to protect themselves from chemical exposure. communication training to follow standard operating procedures
to unload sulfuric acid. On May 10, 2017, OSHA and MGPI
The Mod B process uses two chemicals, propylene oxide and entered an Informal Settlement Agreement, whereby certain
phosphorous oxychloride, which are covered under the OSHA citations and penalties were amended and/or withdrawn.
PSM standard. The standard contains requirements for managing
hazards associated with handling highly hazardous chemicals. Harcros was cited for failing to ensure employees were
Though sodium hypochlorite and 30% sulfuric acid are not not exposed to the hazards of chemicals due to the lack
covered chemicals, MGPI voluntarily applied a number of PSM
181 As mentioned, OSHA’s PSM applies to two chemicals stored above threshold
elements to the entire Mod B process, which included unloading quantities in the Mod B area: (1) propylene oxide and (2) phosphorous oxychloride.
For more information on OSHA’s PSM standard: https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9760. For information on
179 29 CFR 1910.1200(h).
OSHA’s NEP, including the NEP for PSM Covered Chemical Facilities, see: https://
180 29 CFR 1910.1200(h)(3)(ii) 1910.1200(h)(3)(iii). www.osha.gov/dep/neps/nep-programs.html.
CSB MGPI Processing Case Study 37