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Because of the importance of kick detection, the members of the rig crew
should be in constant communication with one another about possible kick
indications, or any other critical observations based on well‐monitoring. On the
Deepwater Horizon, the well site leader was responsible for overseeing all well
operations, including well monitoring. The Transocean toolpusher and senior
toolpusher oversaw the drilling personnel and should be aware of rig operations
that might affect the crew’s ability to monitor for kicks. The Transocean offshore
installation manager (sometimes referred to as the “OIM”) had responsibility for
the entire Transocean crew.
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Much of well monitoring is done through review of real‐time data that rig
personnel access on computer consoles. Sperry‐Sun sent mudloggers to the
Deepwater Horizon and also provided real‐time data that was accessible to the rig
crew. Rig personnel also had access to certain real‐time data from Transocean.
In addition, video cameras on the rig allowed the crew to monitor certain
activities, such as flow being returned to the pits. BP and its operating partners
had access to the real‐time data through Insite Anywhere, BP’s electronic data
system that provides real‐time flow‐in and flow‐out data, gas analysis data,
stand pipe pump pressures, and other data.

MMS regulations required operators to use the best available and safest
technology to monitor and evaluate well conditions and to minimize the
potential for a well to flow or kick. The regulations also required the operator
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to ensure that the toolpusher, operator’s representative, or a member of the
drilling crew maintains continuous surveillance on the rig floor from the
beginning of drilling operations until the well is completed or abandoned, unless
they have secured the well with a BOP, bridge plug, cement plug or a packer.

B. Multiple Simultaneous Operations That Hampered the Crew’s
Ability to Detect Kicks

On April 20, after performing the negative pressure tests that were
incorrectly interpreted as successful, the rig crew turned to completing the
temporary abandonment procedures. The rig crew decided to perform multiple
operations over a short period of time, which likely limited their ability to
effectively monitor the well. At this time, Bob Kaluza and Donald Vidrine were
the BP well site leaders. Brian Morel was the BP drilling engineer, but he had

249 Transocean Well Control Manual, TRN‐USCG_MMS00043810.
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30 CFR § 250.401.

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