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approximately 9:20 p.m., Jason Anderson, the toolpusher, told Miles Ezell, the
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senior toolpusher, that the displacement was “going fine….I’ve got this.” Ezell
testified that Anderson “had more experience as far as shutting in for kicks than
any individual on the Deepwater Horizon.” The Panel found evidence that a
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significant volume of hydrocarbons had already entered the wellbore, but the
Panel found no evidence that the Transocean rig crew had any awareness that
the well was flowing or experiencing a kick at this time.

C. Rig Floor Response

At approximately 9:30 p.m., Revette identified a pressure difference
between the drill pipe and the kill line and shut down the pumps to investigate.
The Sperry‐Sun data indicated that the drill pipe pressure initially decreased
when the pumps shut down. However, the drill pipe pressure then increased by
approximately 550 psi during the next five minutes while the kill line pressure
remained lower. One crew member testified that the driller and the toolpusher
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had concerns about this pressure differential.

The rig crew then attempted to bleed off the drill pipe (i.e., open the well)
to eliminate the pressure differential, which briefly caused the drill pipe pressure
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to decrease. Given that the rig crew at this time decided to bleed off the drill
pipe pressure, they likely still did not understand that the well had begun to
flow. Bleeding off drill pipe pressure during a kick is not an industry‐accepted
practice.

At 9:38 p.m., the drill pipe pressure began to build back up. Dr. Smith
concluded that, at this time, the rig crew routed flow to the trip tank to check
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whether the well was flowing. At approximately 9:42 p.m., the crew detected
flow and diverted the gas to the mud gas separator. At the same moment, or
shortly thereafter, the rig crew activated the upper annular preventer, after the
mud from the well was already flowing on the rig floor. The Sperry‐Sun data
indicates the annular preventer was activated at 9:43 p.m., and by 9:47 p.m., the
variable bore ram had been activated. By this time, the rig crew knew that a well
control event was occurring. The Transocean well control manual provides that
the crew should activate the BOP’s blind shear ram (“BSR”) as the last step in

266 Ezell testimony at 282.
267 Id. at 311.
268 Testimony of David Young, Joint Investigation Hearing, May 27, 2010, at 258‐59.
269 Robinson testimony at 284‐85.
270 Smith Report at 14.

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