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enforce pit management, and carefully monitor for any discrepancies during
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trips.”

Joseph Keith, a Sperry‐Sun mudlogger, testified that the rig crew was
“moving a lot of mud around from different pits, reserve pits, active pits, trip
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tanks [and] sand traps. They were moving a lot of mud around.” Keith
testified that he was concerned about this because he “couldn’t really monitor
the volumes in the pits correctly.” Keith also testified that the activities
255
occurring onboard the Deepwater Horizon were not consistent with Transocean’s
kick prevention procedures. Nevertheless, at no point prior to the blowout,
256
did Keith issue a stop‐work order because, according to his testimony, he “just
didn’t think of it at the time.” Keith testified, however, that the high level of
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mud‐moving activities should have resulted in a stop‐work order from someone
on the rig.
258

Dr. Smith analyzed available data and, in his report, detailed what Keith
and the rest of the crew would have observed had they properly monitored the
well. Just after 8:00 p.m., an increase of main pit volume by 500 barrels, likely the
result of the transfer of seawater into the main pit, precluded the crew from
using pit gain as a monitoring tool. According to Dr. Smith, not having this tool
available complicated kick detection efforts and was not consistent with proper
pit management and monitoring.
259

Dr. Smith concluded that the crew could not properly monitor the well
and detect kicks from 8:38 p.m. to 8:56 p.m. on April 20. During this time, the
flow‐out was significantly less than the flow‐in, in a situation where lost returns
were unlikely. At the same time, the trip tank volume was increasing rapidly,
and the data showed that there was some volume increase in the main pits.
Given the complications created by conducting multiple operations
simultaneously, it is unlikely that the crew was able to evaluate these signals that
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a kick was in progress.

253 TRN‐USCG‐MMS00043810.
254 Keith testimony at 39.
255 Id. at 98.
256 Id at. 39.
257 Id. at 81.
258 Id. at 82.
259 Smith Report at 22.
260 Id.

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