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At 8:58 p.m., flow‐out increased significantly and the pit level rose by
approximately 100 barrels in 15 minutes. According to Dr. Smith, at this point
the crew should have recognized this as a warning sign, stopped circulation and
performed a flow check. Dr. Smith stated that “[t]hese failures to respond to kick
warning signs are in direct violation of standard industry practice and MMS
requirements.” Dr. Smith concluded that the well continued to flow after the
pumps were turned off at 9:09 p.m. This continued flow was “a conclusive
indicator that a kick [was] in progress, i.e., that formation fluids [were] flowing
into the well.”
261

Keith, a mudlogger with 18 years of experience who had responsibilities
for monitoring the well, testified that he went on a five‐to‐eight‐minute break to
the coffee shop and the smoking room area at approximately 9:00 p.m.
According to Keith’s testimony, after the crew shut down the pumps at 9:09 p.m.,
262
he looked at the video feed and did not see any flow. Keith testified that, at
this time, he was not aware of increased pressure on the drill pipe, which was
263
another indicator that a kick was in progress.

At 9:10 p.m., having observed none of the several indications that a kick
was in progress, the crew rerouted returns from the well overboard, which
caused the returns to bypass the Sperry‐Sun flow‐out meter. This meant that
Sperry Sun mudloggers no longer had conventional kick detection methods at its
disposal. Dr. Smith observed that “[i]nitiating this action without insuring that
the well was under control violates all industry practices and regulatory
requirements.”
264

Keith testified that he did not know the well was flowing until “it
sounded like it was raining outside” and he “started smelling gas coming though
[his] purge system.”
265

It is not clear what well control information, if any, the drill crew was
monitoring on the evening of April 20. At 9:18 p.m., the driller, Dewey Revette,
sent rig crew members to repair a pressure relief valve on one of the pumps.
This is significant because it is unlikely that Revette would have sent any crew
members to the pump room if he believed that the well was flowing. At

261 Id.
262 Keith testimony at 50, 118‐120.
263 Id. at 184.
264 Smith Report at 23.
265 Keith testimony at 32.

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