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calculate the estimated maximum gas and fluid flow rates and wellhead
                   temperature that could result from an uncontrolled flow from the zone of the
                                                                         276
                   highest pressure through the open choke manifold.   The maximum kick
                   volume (kick tolerance) should also be calculated to ensure that gas liberation at
                   reasonable kill rates will not overload the mud gas separator.  Prior to the
                   beginning of drilling operations, specific plans must be made and written
                   instructions given to all personnel concerning non‐standard actions/procedures
                   to be performed to prevent or react to any well control problems.
                                                                                        277

                          The Transocean well control manual provided that “the choke and kill
                   manifold low‐pressure valves must be lined up to direct the flow of the well
                                                              278
                   through the Mud Gas Separator (MGS).”   Witness testimony establishes that, at
                   approximately 9:41 p.m., mud from the well began flowing onto the rig floor and
                   the rig crew routed the flow coming from the riser through the diverter system
                                                279
                   into the mud gas separator.   At roughly 9:45 p.m., Stephen Curtis, the assistant
                   driller, called Ezell, the senior toolpusher, to tell him that the well was blowing
                   out, that mud was going into the crown, and that the driller (Anderson) was
                   shutting the well in.
                                        280

                          Micah Sandell, a crane operator, testified about what he saw:


                          After I saw the mud shooting up it was just several seconds and then it
                          just quit.  It went down and, at that time, I yelled at my roustabouts to go
                          to the front of the rig.  Now, whether they heard my radio Iʹm not sure,
                          but it was just several seconds after that ‐‐ I took a deep breath thinking
                          that ʹOh, they got it under control.ʹ  Then all the sudden the degaser is ‐‐
                          mud started coming out of the degaser.  And the degaserʹs on the ‐‐ and
                          Iʹm sure ‐‐ I donʹt know if yʹall know itʹs on the starboard aft of the derrick
                          and itʹs in a goose neck and it points back down to the deck.  And it come
                          out of it so strong and so loud that it just filled up the whole back deck
                          with a gassy smoke and it was loud enough that ‐‐ itʹs like taking an air
                          hose and sticking it to your ear.  Then something exploded.  Iʹm not sure
                          what exploded, but just looking at it, it was where the degaser was sitting,



                   276  Id.  (Section 8, Subsection 5, page 1 of 17).
                   277  Transocean Well Control Manual, TRN‐USCG_MMS00043810.
                   278  Id. (Section 4, Subsection 1 page 4 of 4).
                   279  Testimony of Micah Sandell, Joint Investigation Hearing, May 29, 2010, at 9‐12; Young
                   testimony at 264.
                   280  Ezell testimony at 283.


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