Page 22 - History of War - Issue 01-14

THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

the increase, German forces were decreasing.
Moltke had destroyed the Schlieffen Plan,
and initiative was shifting to the French side.
Ironically, the two corps that von Moltke removed
for use against the Russians were in transit
across Germany when the battles in the east
were won and the battles in the west were lost.
In the north, the German advance proceeded
and nearly brought about the destruction of
ELEMENTS OF VON the BEF. During the retreat, Joffre was obliged
to divide his forces to avoid passing through
KLUCK'S FORCES a large forest. As a result, the British II Corps,
under General Horace Smith-Dorrien, veered
north toward Le Cateau – and once again into
STRUCK II CORPS AT the path of the German Army. Elements of
von Kluck’s forces struck II Corps at Le Cateau
on 26 August, and the situation for the British

The result of Prince Rupprecht’s attack was LE CATEAU, AND soon became desperate. Only a gallant
defence and a hasty retreat under the cover
a tactical victory but a strategic defeat. French of a determined rearguard saved II Corps from
forces were back at their start line and were obliteration. It seemed that it would only be a
able to react with suffi cient speed once the THE SITUATION FOR matter of time before the BEF was destroyed and
nature of events in the north had been realised. the relentless German advance reached Paris.
If massive numbers of French troops were THE BRITISH SOON
engaged deep within Alsace-Lorraine, far from Vulnerable fl ank
adequate transport facilities, the outcome of As the Germans moved through Le Cateau,
the Schlieffen Plan might have been different. BECAME DESPERATE Joffre redeployed his forces north to meet
On 23 August, Joffre fi nally came to the the coming threat. This enabled the French
realisation that Plan 17 was in a shambles and to create two new armies in the north –
that the German advance to the north posed a very hard to halt the retreats of the French and the Sixth and Ninth, under the command of
threat to the very existence of France. Although British forces already in the area. General Michel-Joseph Maunoury and General
Joffre can be blamed for continuing the attack Von Moltke, however, grew ever more scared. Ferdinand Foch respectively. In addition, the
after all hope of victory had faded, and of He made several mistakes that would help ruin French were busy raising a force in Paris under
ignoring danger in the north, he now emerged German chances for a quick victory in the west. the command of Joseph Gallieni. Joffre’s quick
as the saviour of France. Generals up and down In an effort to bolster their Belgian allies, the thinking and determination, coupled with von
the line despaired of any chance to stand up to British had landed a small contingent of troops Moltke’s mismanagement, had begun to alter
the German attack. Joffre, however, stood fi rm in in Antwerp. Though the force posed little threat, the balance of power in northern France. As
his belief in ultimate victory. It was his calmness von Moltke chose to remove troops from the September approached, the Allies had a total
in the face of disaster that eventually won the right fl ank of the advance to invest the Belgian of 41 divisions in the north, as opposed to only
day for the Allies. fortress. Even worse, he over-reacted to events 25 German ones. The initiative had now passed
Methodically, Joffre on the Eastern Front. A Russian invasion of East to the Allies, who were afforded an opportunity
began the Herculean Prussia caused him great alarm, though the to blunt the mighty German advance, now
task of redeploying Schlieffen Plan warned to ignore the actions of nearing the gates of Paris and possible victory.
French forces the Russian Army until it had fully mobilised. On 31 August, the Germans made a fateful
northwards to meet the Wary of the effects of losing German soil to the decision that would alter the course of the First
German offensive Russians, von Moltke removed two army corps World War. In an effort to pursue the supposedly
and defend from the right fl ank of the advance in the west to beaten Allies more closely, and to shorten the
Paris. He aid forces in the east. Thus, while the numbers ground to be covered by their tired armies,
also worked of Allied troops in the the Western Front were on von Kluck and von Bülow decided that German

Key gures

HELMUTH VON MOLTKE ALFRED VON SCHLIEFFEN ALEXANDER VON KLUCK ERICH VON FALKENHAYN
As Chief of German One of the most respected Von Kluck was in command The Prussian Minister of
General Staff, von Moltke strategists of his era, it was of the German First Army, War was considered to be
revised the Schlieffen Plan von Schlieffen who – prior which was part of the cautious and unwilling
to meet modern conditions, to the war – conceived the Schlieffen Plan’s strong to take risks. However,
but this contributed to plan of action that would right-wing offensive that after the disastrous
the halt of the German enable Germany to engage would encircle Paris and Battle of the Marne, he
offensive on the Marne with forces in both the bring a rapid conclusion devised the desperate plan
A non-commissioned

Officer of the British in September 1914, which East and the West. He died to the war. He was said of the Battle of Verdun
Royal Horse Artillery led to him being replaced a year before the First to be an aggressive and in 1916 – one of the
(RHA), as deployed by Kaiser Wilhelm. World War commenced. impatient Commander. war’s bloodiest battles.
in France in 1914
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