Page 256 - Towards_a_New_Malaysia_The_2018_Election_and_Its_6146371_(z-lib.org)

Malaysia’s First-Past-the-Post Electoral System 241

e rst consideration is the constitutional and political hurdles that need
to be overcome, either way. at PH lacks a two-thirds parliamentary majority
means that any constitutional amendment necessitates cross-party consensus.
e only way to x the excessive malapportionment and gerrymandering in
the last delimitation reviews without any constitutional amendment is to let
the eight-year interval before the next review lapse, then remedy constituency
allocation and boundaries in 2023 (Sarawak), 2025 (Sabah), and 2026 (West
Malaysia). A much-discussed option of increasing federal seats to circumvent
the eight-year interval not only necessitates amending Article 46, but may open
the door to states that are already over-represented to demand greater over-
representation. Instead of xing the system, Parliament may end up trading
reduced intra-state malapportionment and gerrymandering for aggravated
inter-state malapportionment. Alternatively, adding seats in state legislatures
where PH is constitutionally or politically empowered to do so may trigger
partial delimitation, to up to 90 out of 222 parliamentary constituencies, but
not, for instance, in the badly malapportioned and gerrymandered state of
Perak. To reset parameters for future delimitation exercises, Parliament may
opt to pass an act (in place of a constitutional amendment) to cap deviation
from equal apportionment and de ne ‘area weightage’ and ‘local ties’.
Properly xing the current mess would require substantial amendments to
the irteenth Schedule and Articles 46 and 113–117—essentially the same
remedy as to introduce a new electoral system. Furthermore, malapportionment
was instituted to entrench Malays’ (and UMNO’s) political dominance; its
proposed removal may trigger Malay-Muslim nationalists’ existential fear.
A new electoral system may be more viable politically if it can address the
communal anxiety the current winner-takes-all system engenders. Even
politicians’ resistance to equal inter-state apportionment of federal seats—
because their own constituency may disappear with the shrinking weight of
their state’s electorate—may be reduced if a mixed-member system allows
them to continue in politics by crossing over from constituency to party-list
election.
e second consideration is that the perils of FPTP may strike by the next
election, not the next generation, even if the system is cleansed of malpractice.
First, if PH is set to face an UMNO-PAS alliance in the next election, ethno-
religious issues will dominate the election campaign in West Malaysia, with
probable countermoves in East Malaysia. However reluctant, the Malay-
based parties in PH may be forced to match UMNO-PAS in their communal
appeals, which may, in turn, drive minorities to prioritise their own communal
interests. Keeping FPTP will not avoid a hung parliament, but may make
the political landscape more fragmented than it is now, with no broad-based

This content downloaded from 139.80.253.0 on Fri, 06 Nov 2020 04:22:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms