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240                                                 Wong Chin Huat

                  DAP’s administrative posts could go to as many as 75 per cent of female
                  parliamentarians (six out of eight) and only 18.4 per cent of male ones (seven
                  out of 38) (Yeung 2018).
                     Gender quotas must therefore start with candidacy. Quotas stand a better
                  chance with multi-member constituencies, where competent women may
                  displace weaker male politicians without threatening stronger ones—as under
                  Indonesia and East Timor’s party-list PR and Singapore’s party-block-vote
                                                            12
                  group representation constituency (GRC) system.
                     By its nature, FPTP prioritizes geographically-organised interests,
                  which in Malaysia are emphasized by the salience of communalism because
                  of predominantly monoethnic settlements in most parts of the country.
                  Noncommunal identities and issues such as class, gender, and the environment,
                  the support base for which may be geographically scattered, cannot  nd
                  adequate representation in federal and state legislatures. Not only does
                  Malaysia not yet have a green party, but the ‘red’ party, Parti Sosialis Malaysia,
                  was wiped out in multi-cornered contests in the 2018 elections, including its
                  sole incumbent, who fell prey to anti-BN strategic voting in Sungai Siput.
                  Historically, the system likewise has punished left-wing parties like Pekemas
                  and PSRM (see Table 11.11).
                     Despite the highly communal nature of Malaysia’s party system, weak issue-
                  representation also stems from the exclusion of tiny minority communities,
                  which are too small or too scattered to hold sway in FPTP constituencies.
                   anks to coalition politics, ethnic Indians, who made up 4.4 per cent of
                  registered voters in 2018 but constituted the majority in no federal or state
                  constituency, were represented by 16 parliamentarians (7.2 per cent) in
                  the federal lower house and four ministers (14 per cent)—including the
                   rst Sikh—in the Cabinet (Little  India  Desk  2018;  PTI  2018). Similarly,
                  politicians from the tiny Portuguese community in Malacca and the wider
                  Eurasian community gain representation through parties like DAP.  e same,
                  however, cannot be said of West Malaysia’s indigeneous peoples (Orang Asli),
                  the Siamese, or small Borneo communities (Orang Asal) like the Penan. It
                  was only in 2019 that the  rst Orang Asli member entered Parliament, having
                  defeated an ethnic-Indian DAP candidate in a by-election.

                   e Choice Between Repair and Reengineering

                  Post-transition Malaysia should consider carefully whether the electoral system
                  needs only piecemeal repairs or reengineering. Even if electoral-system change
                  remains a long-term goal, being open to both options is warranted for two
                  reasons.





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