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DNV stated that its tests of the blue pod in its as‐received condition
demonstrated that “the 27 Volt battery in the Blue Pod had insufficient charge to
activate the solenoid 103B.” DNV noted that there were no records showing that
the batteries in the AMF system were tested during a factory acceptance test in
353
June 2009. DNV further noted that tests for the 27‐volt battery conducted in
July 2010 (when the BOP was retrieved) “reported the battery level to be out of
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specification.”

The Deepwater Horizon crew did not have the ability to monitor the subsea
electronic module (“SEM”) battery power supply, although the Panel is aware of
technology that exists that would allow Transocean to perform this monitoring.
If the crew had been able to monitor the SEM power supply, they could have
known the real time condition of the AMF batteries.

Two other theories regarding the failure of the BOP stack were advanced
during JIT hearings. The first is that the hydraulic systems that powered the BSR
did not have enough power to cause the blind shear rams to fully close and seal.
A Cameron representative stated:

There is a possibility that the shear ram could have been functioned not
through the high pressure circuit but through the manifold pressure,
which would be 1,500 PSI, and itʹs possible that if that happened, we
wouldnʹt have near enough hydraulic force pressure ‐ you could not
generate enough force with that pressure to cut the pipe. In fact, itʹs very
likely that the pipe would only be dented and not shear all the way
through, exposing the ram to the flows that we all have heard about. Itʹs
also possible that for whatever reason the hydraulic system wasnʹt up to
the game that day and didnʹt have sufficient pressure to close it. It is
possible that the solenoid valve, which when tested by DNV in Michoud,
operated intermittently, sometimes it wouldnʹt operate at all and other
times it would operate for a handful of seconds. And it is possible that if
the deadman fired and the solenoid valve did exactly what it did at
Michoud, that the ram could have partially deployed and not gone all the
way across.
355

353 Id.
354 Id. at 170.
355 McWhorter testimony at 144‐45.

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