Page 190 - test2

affected the procedure for the setting of the surface plug, the displacement, and
452
the negative test sequence.

On the day of the blowout, a BP contractor suggested making an
additional wash run due to his concerns about achieving a successful lead
453
impression tool impression. Guide responded by saying “[w]e will never
know if your million dollar flush run was needed. How does this get us to sector
leadership(?)”
454

The Panel found that a number of BP decisions were not subjected to a
formal risk assessment process. In addition, the Panel found no evidence
indicating that, at the time of the blowout, BP had in place any policy or practice
to assess whether safe operations were being compromised to achieve cost
savings.

B. Transocean’s Practices and Procedures

1. Safety‐Related Policies

Transocean was responsible for the safe operation of the Deepwater
Horizon. The company has touted its commitment to safety by pointing towards
its “company‐wide safety management programs and the intensive training
455
regimen required of its rig crews.”

According to Transocean’s health and safety policy statement, “each
employee has the obligation to interrupt an operation to prevent an incident
456
from occurring.” During 2010, Transocean had an array of acronym‐based
safety programs that attempted to ensure safe rig operations (THINK, START,
CAKE, FOCUS, and TOFS). Transocean designed these safety programs to allow
rig personnel to identify hazards and stop work when necessary. The Panel
found no evidence, however, that on April 20 anyone on board the Deepwater
Horizon identified risks that would warrant shutting down operations.

Transocean’s “THINK” program was designed to increase awareness of
safety issues through task planning, hazard identification and assessment of the

452 BP‐HZN‐MBI0097490.
453 BP‐HZN‐MBI00258505.
454 BP‐HZN‐MBI00258507.
455 See Submission of Transocean to the JIT (May 13, 2011), at 1.
456 BP‐HZN‐MBI00001604.

185