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incentives were 50% “discretionary” factors, 37.5% cost related items and 12.5%
                   safety performance.

                          The Panel found no evidence that decisions by Transocean personnel to
                   defer rig maintenance and/or down time were directly rewarded with any type
                   of bonus payment.  However, Transocean’s policy of rewarding personnel based
                   upon a number of different variables (e.g., down time, lost revenue, cash flow
                   value added) when trying to maintain safe operations introduced conflicting
                   priorities and created risks that operational decisions might compromise safety.

                              C.     BP and Transocean Bridging Document

                          BP and Transocean developed a bridging document for operations
                   associated with deepwater drilling in North America.  It outlines the
                   responsibility of both parties to ensure that health and safety management
                   systems are in place, and that all operations are to be conducted in a safe manner.
                   But the bridging document did not include procedures on well control, a crucial
                                                      468
                   topic for safe drilling operations.   This was inconsistent with BP’s prescribed
                                                         469
                   policies for safe drilling operations.

                              D.     Stop Work Authority

                          The Deepwater Horizon had multiple stop work policies in play on the day
                   of the blowout.  BP, Transocean and Halliburton personnel all had company‐
                   specific policies to stop work they deemed to be unsafe.

                          BP’s golden rules of safety state, “[e]veryone who works for or on behalf
                                                                                                 470
                   of BP is responsible for their safety and the safety of those around them.”
                   Transocean’s stop work authority states, “[e]ach employee has the obligation to
                   interrupt an operation to prevent an incident from occurring.”   Halliburton’s
                                                                                     471
                   hazard observation and communication policy states “[t]he HOC Card has been
                   designed for use by all employees regardless of their position or their type or


                   468  The Panel located stand‐alone well control manuals within BP and Transocean; however, but
                   no document bridging the two manuals together.
                   469  Section 15.2.17 of BP’s DWOP requires that “a well control interface / bridging document shall
                   be prepared with the appropriate contractor to ensure there is clear understanding of
                   responsibilities and which reference documents and procedures will be used in a well control
                   situation.”
                   470  BP’s Golden Rules of Safety.
                   471  BP‐HZN‐MBI00001604.


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