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  The risks posed by identified hazards were not fully understood and
                              the subsequent control measures were not always appropriate;
                            Emerging hazards during task execution, and hazards with a changing
                              risk level, were not always detected or fully appreciated; and
                            “They don’t know what they don’t know.”
                                                                           467

                          This difference in awareness of hazards clearly demanded attention, as
                   frontline crews were potentially working with a mindset that they believed they
                   were fully aware of all the hazards when it is likely that they were not.  If a crew
                   is not aware of risks and hazards, it is less likely to be able to recognize unsafe
                   situations and will not take immediate actions to mitigate risks.

                          Taken together, the audits and documentary evidence suggest that the
                   Deepwater Horizon crew was generally effective and safety‐conscious, but may
                   not have had the tools, ability or opportunity to identify and mitigate hazards
                   associated with rig operations.

                                   2.    Transocean 21‐day Hitch Policy

                          In September 2009, Transocean revised its offshore employee hitch
                   schedule from 14 to 21 days.  The revision to the work schedules was partially
                   due to a transportation schedule that would allow for fewer flights to and from
                   the facilities.  Seven of the 11 individuals who died onboard the Deepwater
                   Horizon had been onboard for more than 19 days.  The Panel, however, found no
                   evidence that the Transocean hitch schedule affected rig personnel’s ability to
                   perform their duties.  See Appendix N.

                                   3.    Transocean Incentive Awards

                          Transocean had multiple bonus incentives, dependent upon level of
                   employment (rig, division, rig managers).  Variables of the bonus equations
                   were: safety performance; individual performance; cash flow value added; in‐
                   service daily cost; rig downtime; lost revenue; and overhead cost.

                          Rig employees’ bonus incentives were based on 60% cost‐related items,
                   20% safety performance and 20% individual performance.  Division employees’
                   bonus incentives were weighed in the same way: 60% cost related items, 20%
                   safety performance and 20% individual performance.  Rig managers’ bonus


                   467  TRN‐HCEC 90501.


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