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On the Macondo well, BP had the option to temporarily abandon the well
                   without setting a production casing, as it had done previously with the Kodiak,
                   MC 727, Number 2 and Tiber, KC 102, Number 1 wells when faced with similar
                   narrow drilling margins and lost returns at total depth.  BP’s decision to set
                   casing in the production interval with known drilling margin limits at total
                   depth was a possible contributing cause of the blowout.

                          During the production casing cementing operation, rig personnel
                   continuously monitored the fluids that they pumped into – and that flowed out
                   of – the well.  But rather than measuring flow‐in directly, rig personnel
                   calculated flow‐in based on the pump’s piston volume output and efficiency.
                   The crew measured flow‐out based on the Transocean flow meter paddles and
                   the Sperry‐Sun flow line sonic/radar sensors.  The crew also monitored flow‐out
                   by pit gain volumes.  As discussed above, even with properly calibrated flow
                   measurement devices, there would have been a 10 percent margin of error in the
                   flow‐out calculations.  Dr. Smith, the expert retained by the JIT, used both the
                   main pit volume data and the calculated cumulative flow‐out versus flow‐in data
                   to estimate that approximately 2.3 bbls of mud were lost during the production
                   casing cementing operation.  The Panel used actual flow values to calculate that
                   the losses amounted to approximately 80 bbls (+/‐ 10% based on flow‐in /flow‐
                   out data).  The fact that the Deepwater Horizon crew did not have available to
                   them accurate and reliable flow‐line sensors during cementing operations in
                   order to determine whether they were obtaining full returns was a possible
                   contributing cause of the blowout.

                          There were a number of limitations in the cementing plan that could have
                   contributed to the compromise of the cement job, including the following:

                         Reducing the bottoms up circulation from 2,760 bbls to approximately 350
                          bbls could have increased the likelihood of channeling because: a) there
                          was less cleaning of the wellbore, and b) the reduced bottoms up
                          prevented rig personnel from examining, prior to cementing, the mud for
                          potential contamination by hydrocarbons;

                         Pumping cement at the relatively low flow rate of 4 bpm could have
                          decreased the efficiency with which cement displaced the mud from the
                          annular space, thereby increasing the potential for channeling; and







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