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 David Sims, BP drilling and completions operations manager, expressed
concern about the BP well site leaders’ well control abilities in an email
written following the March 8 kick. He stated that the well site leaders
“are not well control experts. They are fantastic drillers – the best in the
SPU [BP drilling unit], if not the industry. However, they do not circulate
out kicks for a living, especially 1200 feet off bottom with many
unknowns.”
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 Mark Hafle told BP investigators in a post‐blowout interview that he
believed some of the Sperry‐Sun mudloggers did not understand how to
monitor the well properly, and that the Sperry‐Sun personnel were
stretched too thin and did not have enough qualified mudloggers.
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Notwithstanding the high level of concern about the March 8 kick and the
rig crew’s response to the kick, BP did not conduct the type of investigation of
the incident required by BP’s own policies. BP’s drilling and well operations
procedures require a well control incident report to be completed and
165
documented in BP’s internal reporting system and provide that such incidents
should be investigated to determine root causes and to identify ways to prevent
reoccurrence. The Panel found no evidence that BP documented the March
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well control event in its internal tracking system or that it conducted a post‐
incident investigation to determine the root cause of the delayed kick detection.

Instead of conducting a formal investigation, Guide had discussions with
the BP well site leaders and the Transocean rig leaders about the event and the
drilling crew’s response. Guide told BP investigators in a post‐blowout
interview that he believed members of the rig crew understood their
responsibilities and admitted to him that they “had screwed up” by not catching
the kick. Guide also talked to the Sperry‐Sun mudloggers about the detection of
flow.
167

BP’s in‐house group of geological experts, the “Totally Integrated
Geological and Engineering Response team” (the “TIGER team”), conducted an

163 BP‐HZN‐MBI00222540.
164 BP‐HZN‐BLY00125470. As discussed previously in this Report, mudloggers have a
responsibility to monitor the conditions in the well during drilling operations. Monitoring for
potential kicks is among the mudloggers’ most important responsibilities.
165 BP DWOP Manual, Section 15.2.12, BP‐HZN‐MBI00130846.
166 BP DWOP Manual, Sections 3.1.5, BP‐HZN‐MBI00130817.
167 BP‐HZN‐BLY00125447.

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