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66 Helen Ting Mu Hung

2004 general elections e ectively marked the peak in terms of parliamentary
seats for the Chinese-based BN parties, MCA, and to a lesser extent, Gerakan
(cf. Table 4.1). PAS’s perceived Islamic extremism, which contrasted with the
moderate version of political Islam Abdullah Badawi propounded, labelled
Islam Hadhari, provided an added motivation for Chinese voters to support
BN (Abdul Rashid Moten and Tunku Mohar Mokhtar 2006).
It was only in the 2008 and 2013 general elections that Chinese voters
turned progressively away from BN. After taking o ce as prime minister in
2009, Najib Razak had tried to woo back non-Malay support by introducing
the inclusive concept of 1Malaysia. He also initiated the scaling-back of pro-
Malay a rmative-action policies, only to recommit himself shortly thereafter
to implementing a ‘pro-market a rmative action policy’ in the face of protests
by Malay-rights groups such as Perkasa. Having failed to regain Chinese buy-
in at the 2013 general elections and even having lost the popular vote (though
he himself returned as prime minister), Najib recalibrated his political strategy
and began to play to the Malay gallery, including emphasizing Islam and
making overtures to PAS.
UMNO leaders’ support of a PAS-proposed parliamentary initiative to
enhance the punitive power of the sharia courts appeared to have created high
expectations among PAS leaders convinced they could push their advantage
further (Ting 2017). Hoping to play the role of kingmaker in the 2018 general
elections, they decided to contest as linchpin of a third bloc, named Gagasan
Sejahtera, elding candidates in an unprecedented 157 seats nationwide. is
extraordinary PAS e ort appeared to be orchestrated by Najib, as a shrewd
move to split opposition support by increasing the number of three-cornered
contests, in which incumbents have usually prevailed in the past (Ting 2017).
In the meantime, newly delineated electoral constituencies gazetted in 2018
increased the share of seats with high concentrations of Malay voters, such that
almost two-thirds of the seats in the peninsula were at least 60 per cent Malay
(see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). is change, together with other measures, proved
insu cient to stem the tide of opposition against BN. BN lost federal power
for the rst time, after six decades of political dominance. As Tables 4.3 and
4.4 make plain, PH has replaced BN as the main bene ciary of cross-ethnic
vote-pooling.
It may be seen in Table 4.3 that a majority of BN candidates (107 seats of
165 the coalition contested in West Malaysia) received less than 40 per cent
of the popular vote. BN candidates fared especially poorly in three-cornered
ghts with PAS and PH candidates, winning only six of these contests. BN
candidates were relatively more successful when contesting in seats with 80

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