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78 Helen Ting Mu Hung

up his political credentials among Malay voters and his cordial relationship
with PAS national leaders had the reverse e ect of driving away non-Malay
fence-sitters. e only uncertainty was the e ect of having so many three-
cornered contests, which were presumed able to dilute Malay opposition votes
to the advantage of UMNO. is apparent strategy seems to have succeeded:
PH received a lower share of Malay votes than PAS or UMNO, especially on
the east coast of the peninsula. However, as detailed above, Malay support
for PH on the west coast was uneven, but could reach high levels even where
PH elded DAP candidates, to the extent of exceeding Malay support for
PAS in some constituencies. In addition, overwhelming non-Malay support,
even when non-Malays did not constitute a majority of voters, was crucial in
ensuring PH’s victory.
Horowitz’s (1985) notion of a multiethnic coalition provides a useful
lens through which to understand electoral politics in Malaysia. Cross-
ethnic vote-pooling has provided an important electoral incentive for
interethnic conciliation and cooperation despite deep ethnic cleavages in
the society. Horowitz (2014) categorizes the Malaysian case as centripetal,
a model encouraging interethnic power sharing, but has cautioned against
its susceptibility to degradation over time, as the initial conditions that had
encouraged voluntary interethnic cooperation may decline in importance or
disappear over time. Many observers, including Horowitz (2014) himself,
have noted that the BN formula of interethnic power sharing and conciliation
has deteriorated and become increasingly ine ectual due to the overbearing
domination of UMNO leaders. e outcome of the 2018 general elections
seems to demonstrate that the centripetal impetus in Malaysian politics
remains resilient, in the sense that a contender for federal power can succeed
only if it commands su cient support from both sides of the ethnic divide.
PH’s ability to foster such multiethnic consensus contributed to the demise
of BN.
DAP had bene tted from cross-ethnic vote-pooling as a component party of
PH. While PH’s other component parties are mainly Malay-based (Keadilan’s
multiethnic membership notwithstanding), a professedly noncommunal DAP
is not content to remain as a Chinese-based party, and internal debates on the
right approach to cultivate a friendly image among Malay voters have been
ongoing since the 2013 elections. Since its signi cant electoral gains in 2008
(see Table 4.1), DAP managed to retain and expand its support among non-
Malay voters, in part thanks to Najib’s political manoeuvres, which unwittingly
further solidi ed Chinese rejection of BN. DAP has also been attempting to
reach out to Malay voters and has been elding more Malay candidates. In

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