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Cross-ethnic Vote-pooling in West Malaysia 77

e estimated Malay support for DAP in two other seats, Ayer Hitam and
Raub, is only around 6 per cent, far below the gures for other seats. Contesting
in these two seats were, respectively, Wee Ka Siong, the constituency’s three-
term incumbent and the MCA deputy president; and Chew Mei Fun, a vice-
president of MCA and formerly a deputy minister. Both these candidates
probably received more than 5 per cent of Chinese votes, too. During
the campaign, MCA had attacked DAP for wanting to get rid of Chinese
representation in the cabinet, based on the assumption that BN would be
returned as the federal government, but without Chinese representatives to
take up ministerial portfolios. A higher rate of Chinese support for MCA
would have similarly reduced the DAP’s share of Chinese votes below our
rule-of-thumb percentage, causing us to underestimate Malay support there.
For all seats apart from those ve, rates of Malay support for the two parties
tally to close to 100 per cent, deviating by less than 2 per cent in all except
Kulai (Table 4.14). If we exclude the aforementioned ve ‘anomalous’ seats (in
which we might have cause to expect a higher than average level of Chinese
support for MCA), the average Malay support by party is, respectively, 43.1
per cent for MCA, 29.0 per cent for PAS, and 32.1 per cent for DAP. It is
interesting that, in this case, DAP obtained a higher slice of the Malay vote
than PAS, though trailing behind MCA. Some scholars have noted the lack
of signi cant hardcore Malay support for PAS in the west-coast states such
as Selangor and Johor. is pattern may also indicate substantial numbers of
Malay voters not averse to the DAP and determined to get Najib out of the
o ce by supporting PH, via a DAP candidate or otherwise. Granted, this
pattern of support is speci c to the situation on the west coast of peninsular
Malaysia; none of these seats were on the PAS-leaning east coast.

Conclusion

Before election day in 2018, there was a general consensus among political
analysts and pollsters that BN would de nitely have lost the election had PAS
stayed in the opposition coalition and contested against BN on a one-on-one
basis. e economic hardship ordinary voters had experienced due to rising
costs of living, despite reported economic growth; the numerous nancial
improprieties happening in government agencies and reported or leaked to
the media (with the 1MDB scandal the most momentous); and the spread of
information critical of the government via the internet and social media that
could not be censored e ectively were key factors contributing to rejection of
BN. On the ethnic front, Najib’s playing of ethnic and religious cards to shore

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