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Cross-ethnic Vote-pooling in West Malaysia 75

In three-cornered ghts, when PAS intervened, it can be safely assumed
that its candidates attracted almost 100 per cent of Malay voters. In the
absence of a PAS candidate, strongly anti-BN Malay voters would have voted
for DAP while those who were strongly anti-DAP would have voted for MCA.
A comparison of the average popular votes MCA and DAP each obtained in
one-on-one (Table 4.11) versus three-cornered contests (Table 4.13), given a
similar Chinese share of the electorate, indicates that both parties lost Malay
votes to PAS: both obtained lower average popular votes when PAS also
contested.

Table 4.13 Vote share in relation to the Chinese electorate in MCA-DAP-
PAS three-cornered contests (2018)
Chinese voters (%) Average popular vote (%)*
MCA DAP PAS
50–59.9 (4) 23.1 67.5 8.3
40–49.9 (4) 29.9 59.3 9.4
30–39.9 (4) 23.5 58.1 17.3
Note: *Average popular votes are calculated based on the total number of votes cast
(inclusive of spoilt votes).

Table 4.14 estimates Malay support for MCA and DAP in the 12 three-
cornered contests, based on the same twin assumptions as in the one-on-one
contests, but assuming also that PAS derived its support solely from Malays.
ree of the constituencies in Table 4.14 (Kampar, Labis, and Bentong) stand
out, as our estimated rate of Malay support for DAP in each is in the negative.
In Bentong, MCA president Liow Tiong Lai, who had held the seat for four
terms and was a long-time minister, contested; Labis was contested by two-term
incumbent Chua Tee Yong, who is an MCA vice president and was the deputy
minister for international trade and industry. e MCA candidate for Kampar,
Lee Chee Leong, is another vice president of the party and was a four-term
state assemblyperson from 1990 to 2004. He won the Kampar parliamentary
seat in 2008 and was appointed a deputy minister during that term. e year
2018 marked his second unsuccessful attempt to retake Kampar. e identities
of these candidates make it likely that they would have received a much higher
proportion of Chinese support than just the 5 per cent otherwise assumed. e
resulting overestimation of Chinese votes for the DAP in these seats yields an
underestimation of Malay support.

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