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Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon emergency response manual provides
                   guidance for when to activate the emergency disconnect system.  The Transocean
                   well control manual outlines the different alert levels that reflect the dynamic
                   positioning status of the rig.  The “green” level means that the dynamic
                   positioning systems is functioning in normal operations; the “yellow” level
                   means the station‐keeping ability (the ability to keep the MODU on position) is
                   deteriorating and that preparations to disconnect should begin; and the “red”
                   level signals that disconnection is necessary due to continuing deterioration of
                   station‐keeping abilities.  Transocean’s manual states that there is redundant
                   communication in the driller’s console and on the bridge to ensure that the driller
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                   and crew on the bridge can communicate in the case of any emergency.

                          Transocean’s well control emergency response manual requires drill
                   crews to discuss possible emergency disconnect actions.  The manual does not
                   provide the rig’s master with defined emergency disconnect responsibilities.
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                   The drilling crew, not the master, will typically be in the best position to evaluate
                   possible emergency disconnect actions in a drilling‐related emergency.  An
                   expert retained by the JIT, Captain Carl Smith, testified that, as a master, he
                   would “rely on the experience of the people on the drill floor” to determine
                   when to initiate emergency disconnect actions.
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                          The Panel found no evidence that there was any attempt to activate the
                   blind shear rams or the emergency disconnect system from the driller’s panel.
                   Chris Pleasant, the Transocean subsea engineer, attempted to initiate emergency
                   disconnect actions from the bridge and said, “everything in the panel did like it
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                   was supposed to at the panel…I had no hydraulics.”   Pleasant said that the
                   panel went through its sequence after the explosions, but the rig was unable to
                   disconnect the riser and lower marine riser package from the BOP stack.













                   296  Transocean Well Control Manual, TRN‐USCG_MMS00043810.
                   297  Transocean Well Control Manual, TRN‐USCG_MMS00043810.
                   298  Testimony of Carl Smith, Joint Investigation Hearing, October 8, 2010, at 21.
                   299  Pleasant testimony at 123.


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