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IX.        Conclusions on Temporary Abandonment, Kick Detection,

                              and the Emergency Response

                              A.     Kick Detection and Response Failure Cause

                          At approximately 9:42 p.m., the crew detected flow and diverted the gas
                   influx from the well to the mud gas separator in accordance with the Transocean
                   well control manual.  Shortly thereafter, the rig crew activated the upper annular
                   preventers and the upper variable bore ram, after mud ejected from the well was
                   already on the rig floor.  The failure of the Deepwater Horizon crew (including
                   BP, Transocean, and Sperry‐Sun personnel) to detect the influx of
                   hydrocarbons until hydrocarbons were above the BOP stack was a cause of the
                   well control failure.

                          BP’s negative test procedures instructed personnel to monitor the well for
                   no flow and no pressure on the kill line.  According to personnel monitoring the
                   well, the well was not flowing for 30 minutes and there was no pressure on the

                   kill line.  But anomalies present during the negative tests, such as the presence of
                   drill pipe pressure when the kill line pressure was zero, should have prompted
                   the rig crew to investigate the results further.  The Deepwater Horizon crew’s
                   (BP and Transocean) collective misinterpretation of the negative tests was a
                   cause of the well control failure.

                              B.     Kick Detection Failure Contributing Causes


                          Pit volume (flow‐out) data is more accurate measure of flow than
                   calculating volume from pump output strokes and efficiency (flow‐in) and is the
                   preferred method for measuring flow.  During critical cement testing, the crew
                   was using active pits number 9 and number 10 to transfer fluids to other pits,
                   while at the same time transferring fluids from the rig to the Damon Bankston.
                   Due to the activities onboard the Deepwater Horizon, the mudloggers were
                   concentrating on the flow‐out and flow‐in meters.  The Deepwater Horizon
                   crew’s inability to accurately monitor pit levels while conducting
                   simultaneous operations during the critical negative test was a contributing
                   cause of the kick detection failure.








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