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likely consequences of a potential incident.  The THINK program attempts to
                                                                                457
                   reduce risks through preventative and mitigating actions.   According to
                   Transocean documents, “[t]he THINK process reminds personnel to think about
                   everything they do before actually doing it.”. . . ”THINK is used by the company
                   to formulate and communicate the plan.”. . .“The THINK Planning Process is
                   utilized for Risk Management of all activities and tasks carried out throughout
                                   458
                   the company.”

                          Transocean’s “START” program was a related process that is defined as
                   “See, Think, Act, Reinforce, and Track.”  Transocean stated that the START
                   process “monitor[ed] the operation and reinforce[ed] safe behavior, while
                   correcting any unsafe acts or conditions, [and] is vital to ensure that the
                   necessary controls remain in place during implementation. . . .  START is used by
                   the company to monitor the plan and recognize when the plan is no longer
                   suitable.”
                             459

                          “CAKES” was Transocean’s program for task planning.  The acronym
                   incorporates different rules using the words comply, authority, knowledge,
                                          460
                   experience, and skills.   Transocean’s “FOCUS” approach seeks to make
                                                                                               461
                   consistent the execution of THINK and START across the organization.   TOFS
                   (time out for safety) was Transocean’s stated policy that allowed tasks to be
                                                                                 462
                   stopped (planned or unplanned) to ensure safe operations.

                          None of these policies eliminated concerns about some members of the
                   Transocean crew.  The Panel found evidence that Paul Johnston, Transocean rig
                   manager, questioned whether the Transocean members of the Deepwater Horizon
                   crew were adequately prepared to independently recognize hazards.  In a March
                   2010 email to Guide, Johnson offered a candid assessment of the rig crew and
                   their abilities:

                          John, I thought about this a lot yesterday and asked for input from the rig
                          and none of us could come up with anything we are not already doing or
                          have done in the past with little success.  There was a common theme
                          from all though.  Nothing takes the place of supervisor involvement to ask

                   457  See Submission of Transocean to the JIT (May 13, 2011), at 2.
                   458  BP‐HZN‐MBI00001764.
                   459  BP‐HZN‐MBI00001626.
                   460  BP‐HZN‐MBI00001769.
                   461  BP‐HZN‐MBI00001627.
                   462  BP‐HZN‐MBI00001770.


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