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analysis of the March 8 kick. This was not the type of incident investigation
required by the DWOP, but rather a study of the pore pressure and other
geological conditions encountered in the well. In an email “re‐evaluating how
we manage real time pore pressure detection for Macondo type wells,” a BP
geologist stated that “we need to have PP [pore pressure] conversations as soon
as ANY indicator shows a change in PP” and we “need to be prepared to have
168
some false alarms and not be afraid of it.” He also noted:

Better lines of communication, both amongst the rig subsurface and
drilling personnel, and with Houston office need to be reestablished.
Preceding each well control event, subtle indicators of pore pressure
increase were either not recognized, or not discussed amongst the greater
group. It is the responsibility of the mudloggers and well‐site PP/FG
personnel to openly communicate with the well‐site geologist.
169

This analysis by the TIGER team, which was focused on geological conditions in
the Macondo well, was not intended to address the specific ways in which the rig
crew should monitor the well. Morel, Hafle and Cocales presented a document
to the TIGER team on March 18 that addressed some of the events of March 8,
but this document did not include a discussion of any measures to be
implemented to ensure that the rig crew could detect kicks more quickly and
170
effectively. The Panel found no evidence that Morel, Hafle, and Cocales
presented information related to the March 8 kick detection problems to anyone
else involved in operations at Macondo.

After the March 8 incident, BP had to abandon the wellbore (leaving
behind a number of costly drilling tools) and perform a bypass to continue
drilling the well. Responding to the kick and conducting the bypass operation
171
resulted in additional cost and timing delay for the Macondo well.

Except for one person, the rig personnel involved in kick detection and
response on March 8, including a mudlogger, drillers, assistant drillers, a senior
toolpusher, and toolpushers, were the same individuals on duty on April 20
when the blowout occurred.
172

168 BP‐HZN‐MBI00113015.
169 BP‐HZN‐MBI00113017.
170 BP‐HZN‐BLY00036098.
171 A bypass or sidetrack operation is performed by drilling a directional hole to bypass an
obstruction in the well.
172 One of the mudloggers on duty on April 20 was not involved in the March 8 kick.

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