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On April 17, Guide wrote to Sims:

David, over the past four days there have been so many last minute
changes to the operation that the WSL’s have finally come to their wits
end. The quote is ‘flying by the seat of our pants.’ More over, we have
made a special boat or helicopter run everyday. Everybody wants to do
the right thing, but this huge level of paranoia from engineering
leadership is driving chaos. This operation is not Thunderhorse. Brian
has called me numerous times trying to make sense of all the insanity.
Last night’s emergency revolved around the 30 bbls of cement spacer
behind the top plug and how it would affect any bond logging (I do not
agree with putting the spacer above the plug to begin with). This morning
Brian called me and asked my advice about exploring opportunities both
inside and outside of the company.

What is my authority? With the separation of engineering and operations
I do not know what I can and can’t do. The operation is not going to
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succeed if we continue in this manner.

The Panel found no evidence that any of the issues raised by Sims and
Guide regarding Guide’s performance, the lack of clear authority and reporting
lines, and management of changes to the operation were resolved or even
meaningfully addressed prior to April 20.

D. Safety Stand‐down

Events around a proposed so‐called safety stand‐down on the Deepwater
Horizon reinforced the fact that there were significant problems with oversight of
rig operations and communications. Ronnie Sepulvado, one of the BP well site
leaders on the rig at the time, notified Guide on April 10 of a first aid incident
aboard the Deepwater Horizon, which involved a roustabout sustaining an injury
to his left leg from a load being lifted by a crane. Guide and Sims discussed the
incident, and Guide suggested a “safety stand down tomorrow so we can get our
act together.” Sims agreed with the idea of a stand‐down, and he added

196 BP‐HZN‐MBI00255906. The allocation of responsibilities between operations and engineering
were outlined in a document that BP referred to as a “RACI” chart. See Appendix K.

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