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230                                                 Wong Chin Huat

                  of party-reduction, Cox illustrates that disproportional electoral outcomes—
                  whether through an executive presidency or parliamentary government with
                  FPTP—necessitate strategic voting and drive political forces to amalgamate
                  into two groups. In contrast, a parliamentary polity with a less demanding
                  electoral system that yields proportional electoral outcomes reduces the need
                  for strategic voting, thus sustaining many parties, representing diverse interests.
                  In this light, disproportionality that marginalises small, often radical parties is
                  an evil necessary to produce a two-party system.
                     Modelled on the British two-party system, a two-coalition system has been
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                  Malaysian democratisers’ main objective since 1990.  Beyond allowing party
                  alternation, the British party system is well-known for two advantages:  rst,
                  centripetal competition, as the two main parties pursue the median voter;
                  and second, ‘responsible government’, as voters can easily hold single-party
                  governments accountable. By unleashing hope that power could peacefully
                  change hands between the BN  and  a  second  multiethnic  coalition, much
                  like it does between the Conservatives and Labour in the UK, that narrative
                  provided legitimacy and motivated the repressed opposition.
                     However, in adopting  the  FPTP electoral system  in  1955,  Malaysian
                  democrats hoped to emulate the British party system without much debate on
                  its feasibility or suitability for the local context. Can FPTP produce a hoped-
                  for two-coalition system on Malaysian soil? If it does, will the two main parties
                  compete centripetally? Are ethnoreligious communities rewarded or penalised
                  for multiparty competition? Will the coalitions be stable internally? Lastly,
                  two-coalition system or not, can a fair number of women be elected and issues
                  be  represented  e ectively?   ese  questions  of  potential  mismatch  are  long
                  overdue for debate but had been little considered before the BN’s fall. It is
                  time to seek answers.


                  Consequence of Mismatch 1: No Two-coalition System
                  An alternative multiethnic coalition has succeeded in ending the BN’s rule in
                  its fourth attempt, but it still has yet to establish a sustainable two-coalition
                  system.  With its Chinese and Indian votes depleted nationwide, BN was
                  practically reduced to UMNO and its Borneo-based allies. However, within
                  a week of the BN’s defeat, all its Sabah allies ditched UMNO, followed
                  barely a month after by the entire Sarawak BN, which rebranded itself as
                  the independent Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) with 19 parliamentarians.
                  Worse, UMNO has since lost 17 of its parliamentarians to defection and
                  exodus, with its Sabah chapter virtually gone by the end of 2018. As of






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