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Malaysia’s First-Past-the-Post Electoral System 233

why opposition parties had formed united fronts to capitalise on UMNO’s
schisms and why the Borneo parties left BN.
e favourable conditions needed for FPTP to shape a two-party system are
clear. If all constituencies can be made communally mixed, then the necessity
of vote-pooling will sustain a two-coalition system even when the opposition is
at low tide. is result is, however, impossible given the prevalence of Malay-
majority constituencies, especially in Kelantan and Terengganu, where even
gerrymandering cannot create mixed constituencies. FPTP can still work its
magic if the losing coalition remains upbeat despite defeat, but that was not
the case for Malaysia’s three previous opposition coalitions and now BN.

Table 11.13 Calculation of the bene ts to parties of joining a coalition
Power-sharing consideration
Considerations and contexts In strong In weak
In government
opposition opposition
In communally No for power-
mixed Yes for both Yes for both sharing; yes for
Vote-pooling constituencies vote-pooling
consideration In communally Yes for power- Yes for power-
homogenous sharing; no for sharing; no for No for both
constituencies vote-sharing vote-sharing

Consequence of Mismatch 2: No Centripetal Competition

While a national two-coalition system may be unattainable, regional two-
coalition/two-party systems are emerging in post-GE14 Malaysia. PH and
BN combined secured about 90 per cent of votes and all but three of 57
parliamentary seats in East Malaysia. Across West Malaysia, PH, BN, and
PAS split 99 per cent of votes and all but one of 165 parliamentary seats.
Seen more closely, PAS and BN rmly dominated 95 per cent-Malay Kelantan
and Terengganu, while west-coast states from Penang to Johor, in which non-
Malays comprise half the electorate, were divided between PH and BN. In
three bu er-zone states—Perlis, Kedah, and Pahang, where Malays constitute
three-quarters of the electorate—PAS won nearly 30 per cent of votes, yielding
three-party competition (Table 11.14).
e emergence of regional bipartism ts perfectly with theory. FPTP
successfully forces voters to converge in all regions except the borderline states
of Perlis, Kedah, and Pahang, which are neither predominantly Malay nor
heavily multiethnic. Strategic voting was certainly incomplete, producing

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