Page 21 - NAVAL SCIENCE 3 TEXTBOOK

26 NAVAL KNOW LED GE

that the United States is a maritime nation and always will be. theory. It was based on the premise that complete air superiority,
j'vlahan's theor)' of maritime strategy remtlins completely appli- as opposed to just local or temporaq' air superiority, is possible.
cable to America and its aUies. Insular safety is no longer a valid I-Ie criticized O\'erseas bases as untenable, downgraded the impor-
concept, however, with the advcnt ofland- and sea-launched intcr- tance of naval and land combat, and stated that "the manifest des-
continental ballistic missiles. till)' of the United States is in the skies." In his view the main area
of East-\Vest confrontation would be across the Arctic Ocean, not
The Continental School the Atlantic or Pacific.
De Seversky drew a circle centered on the United States, show-
SOl11e thirty years after Mahan's writings, in 191 9 British geog-
ing the 5,000-mile strike radius of contemporaq' manned bomb-
rapher Sir Hnlrord J. MacKinder published nn alternative thesis that
ers. A similar circle WilS drawn centered on the Soviet Union. The
emphasized the strategic importance of geographic landmasses. In
southernmost extremities of these circles represented United
his work, Democmtic Menls ami Ren/it)~ he hypothesized that by
States or Soviet air dominance .. ll'eas. The (e!ltml ilreil where the
controlling Asiatic Russia and most of Eastern Europe, i.1l1 nrca
circles overlapped he called the "Area of Decision"; it encompassed
he called the "Heartkmd," a central land power could eventutlily
the bulk of the Eurasian and North American continents, and the
extend control to the rest of the world.
entire Arctic region. Here is where he postulated the struggle for
j'vlacKi nder believed that the nation in control of this strong.
masteq' of the air would be decided, and with that decision, domi-
centralized land position could move powerful armies in an)' direc-
nation of the globe.
tion with little opposition. The first gOtli of stich a nation would be
Most strategists today believe the aerospace theory is entirely
to subjugate the rest of Europe and Asitl; this geographic rimland
too restrictive. People and nations are located all the Eilrth's sur-
of Eurasia he Iltlllled the "Inner" or "~vlarginal Crescent." The next
face, and so are its resources. Resolution of conAict and exploi-
step would be to conquer Africa, which, along with Eurasia, he
tation of resources must be accomplished by forces on the land,
called the "World Island." Once consolidated, he believed that the
regardless of the aerial outcome. This was delllonstrated in the
nation in control of the \'\'orld Island would control the bulk of the
Vietnam \·Var in the 1960s and I 970s, in Desert Storm against
world's resources. Then it would be just a matter of time before the
Iraq in the early 1990s, and again in the invasions of Afghanistan
remainder of the world, called the "Outer" or "Insular Crescent,"
in 200 I and Iraq in 2003. Destruction of the surface b)' air attack
would fall under the domination of the central land power.
leaves nothing for an),one.
\·Vorld \Vars I and II were in many ways fought to prevent
l\t{;lCKinder's premises from becoming reality. Interestingl)" his
theories also foretold the nature of much of the connict that would
Grand Strategy and Preparedness
occur between the Soviet Union and the \·Vest during the Cold
World War II and its aftermath prol'ed be)'ond an)' doubt that
War years that rollo\\'ed. The Soviets played the role or the con-
modern Wilr had grown more total than ever. Military strategy now
tinental land powel' that sought to e~1end its domination of the
hild to be considered, .. llong with science, industf)', diplomacy, and
Heartland to the \Vorld Island and beyond. However, it was ulti-
psychology, as an integral part of a national grand strategy. \,Vilr has
matel)1 blocked from gaining control of the "Inner Crescent" (the
now become, more than anything, a contest of opposing politicill
Middle East and Southeast Asia) by the dominant sea power, the
and economic ideas waged on all fronts in the international arena.
United States, and the other \\'estern European NATO nations.
A key factor in such a competition is preparedness, both mil-
Man}' contemporar), strategists still support Mac Kinder's basic
itary and nonmilitar),. Preparedness is a matter of maintaining
theories, although the continental school ideal of totall}' secure inte-
the appropriate strength or power base from which to launch the
rior lines of communication in the heartland has been shattered b)'
ideas and take the actions essential to the implementation of the
aircraft and intercontinental missiles. In addition, the development
grand strateg),.
of an adequate system of roads and rail transportation sufficient to
Among Clausewitz's teachings is the following, which any-
establish these interior lines has not occurred to date.
one who would reduce American preparedness should seriously
consider:
The Aerospace School
\·Vith the advent of modern aircraft and guided missiles after Woe to the Cabinet which, with a policy of hair measures and a
\·VorId \·Var I I, many proponents of modern air power declared both fettered military system, comes upon an ad\'ersary who ... knows
no other Jaw than that of his intrinsic strength. Ew ry deficicncy
Mahan's and MacKinder's theories obsolete. One such critic who
in acti\'ity and elTort then is a weight on the scales in favor of the
gained prominence was U.S. Air Force strategist Major Alexander
enemy. If bloody slaughter is it horrible spectacle, then it should
de Seversky. Benefiting from earlier work by Italian army air officer
be a reason for treating war with more respect, but not for mak-
Giulio Douhet nnd the experiences of\Vorid \·Var II, de Seversky in
ing the sword we bear blunter <lnel blunter by degrees from feei-
his 1950 book, Air Power: Key to SlIrl'iJ'al, put forth a competing