Page 26 - NAVAL SCIENCE 3 TEXTBOOK

SEA POWE R AN]) NAT IONA L SECURI TY 31

without them being used. This does not mean that strategists and
tacticians can eliminate these weapons from their planning. To do
so would certainly be foolish if a potential adversary were known
to possess them. But it is at least conceivable that humankind will
take the necessary effort to prcvent these and other weapons of
mass destruction from being llsed in any future conflict.
Another technical innovation that was used for the first time to
great tactical advantage in Operation Desert Storm in the Persian
Gulf \'Var in 1991, and later in the invasions of Afghanistan in
2001 and Iraq in 2003, is the "smart" weapon, such as laser-guided
bombs, rockets, and programmable cruise missiles. These highly
accurate precision weapons have greatly increased the probabil-
ity of successful target destruction with just a single shot or attack,
often from far greater ranges than were possible before. They are
more "surgical" in nature, and greatly reduce the possibility of col-
lateral damagc to innocent civilians and private property.
UAVs such as the Predator shown here provide real -time infrared 1\·Jorc recently, much use has been made of various kinds of
and color video to intelligence analysts and controllers both on ships
at sea and on shore, and can be fitted with smart weapons for covert remotel}' controlled lllIl11(11/IICa aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct
attacks. all manner of surveillance of enemy instaUations and personnel,
and on occasion to attack them using the variolls kinds of preci-
sion weapons described above. The}' range in size from drone air-
Tactics versus Strategy craft launched from airstrips and ships, to model airplane-size

Tactics is defined as the art and science of fighting battles. ones that can be launched by troops in the field. j\·lore about them
TraditionaU)" it has been distinguished from strategy in a military will be presented later in this textbook.
sense. Strategy has always been concerned with the politics, econ- These and other innovations will undoubtedly continue to
omies, and planning that goes on in the prelude to battle. Strategy have far-reaching effects on all aspects of military and naval tac-
includes the large movements and disposition of forces among the tics in the future.
theaters of operations and the direction of the overal1 campaigns.
T..'lctics, according to Karl von C1ausewitz, is the "formation and
Naval Force Capabilities
conduct of single combats in themselves."
Strategy gives tactics its direction, although strategy is often The U.S. Navy must have certain capabilities if it is to be able to
limited by the tactical capabilities of the forces employed. Tactics . support our national strategy. The Navy's ballistic missile subma-
depend on the strategic considerations involved with the planning rine (SS13N) fleet has long been a vital part of our nation's stra-
and conduct of campaigns; successful tactics meet the strategic tegic ,/lldenr triad, along with land-based intercontinental ballis-
requirements of the broad plan. tic missiles (ICBMs) and long-range strategic bombers. Since the
1960s this triad has supported our national strategy of nuclear
deterrence against attack by weapons of mass destruction by any
Modern Tactical Innovations nation having this capability. All other forces in our Navy are called

The tactical considerations of the atomic age permeated all aspects general purpose forces. In order to support other aspects of our
of warfare during the Cold \Var, and to a great extent since. The national strateg}', they must have the tactical capabilities summa-
key to survival in atomic warfare is dispersal, and that is depen- rized below.
dent on mobility. The first atomic weapons were mass destruction Offensive power. Naval forces must have sufficient power to be
bombs designed to neutralize industrial cities or huge concentra- capable of projecting power through such means as carrier and
tions of forces. \Vith the dispersal capability of modern infantr)' amphibious battle forces. and destroying all hostile forces in the
divisions and the mobility of naval forces, however, it became nec- theater of operations by weapons such as guns and missiles. The
essary to develop low-yield nuclear artillery and rockets to fit the Navy's offensive capabilities in the theater must be credible to allies
changing tactical picture. Just as ships are intended to be mobile for defense and to potential enemies for deterrence.
and largely self-sufficient, the modern army division includes both Defensive strenglh. Deployed naval forces llluSt be able to
air and ground transport to aid in dispersing its forces. quickly react to and defend against any enemy attack within a
Though atomic weapons arc surely here to stay, several lim- given theater. Such attacks might range from localized actions ini-
ited wars and numerous insurrections have been fought since 1945 tiated by terrorists to large-scale attacks by forces equipped with