Page 22 - NAVAL SCIENCE 3 TEXTBOOK

SEA POWER AN D NATIO NAL SE CU RITY 27

ings of humanity. until once again someone steps in with a sword vided the nuclear umbrella integral to each of those trcaties. Nuclear
that is sharp. and hews away the arms from our bod),. deterrence W<lS the b<lsis of national strategy, and thc threat was mas-
sive retaliation for any major aggression. This stmtegy workcd dur-
Clausewitz's statcment points out that a government cannot dctcr
ing these years, and deterred major war. However, massive retaliation
an adversary from waging WM with half measures and inadequate
failed to discourage the outbreak of limited wars along the castern
military strength. Eveq' sign of deficiency will be used to advan-
rim of Asia li·om Malaysia to Korea in the 19505. The stmtegy of
tage by the opponent. If we hope to avoid war, then the best strat-
reliancc on a single we,apon system proved to be inadequate for the
egy is to be fully prepared to fight one should our national survival
chaUenge of the times. Other options had to be developed.
require it.
Flexible resllonse. During the presidency of John F. Ken nedy
in the e<lrly 1960s, the U.S. strategy Wi.lS modified to cope with
Evolution of U.S. Grand Strategy all levels of aggression. This madc nccessary the development of
an ability to apply controlled force decisively against any kind of
u.s. grand strateg}, has evolved through several phases from the
aggression, at times and places of our choosing. Thc armed forces
earliest days of our republic to the present day, in response to the
were dirccted to be ready to suppress, simultaneollsly, a gen-
ever-changing dynamics of the world around us.
eral war, a major conventional war in Europe or Asia, and minor
In the first phase, referred to as thc pcriod of Hbtem hCllli-
insurgencies or revolutionary wars worldwide. Such an ambitious
spheric defellSe (1783-1898), entangling alliances wcrc shunned.
undertaking soon hit budgetary roadblocks. Flexible response was
The Unitcd States tended toward isolationism while shrewdly rcc-
too expensive, and the American public was unwilling to pay the
ognizing the balance of power that existed in Europe, and the fact
price to Illaintain slich force capabilities.
that the British Royal Nav}"s command of the seas ensured our
The strategy, however, was valid. It was the manncr of imple-
national security. The i'vlonroe Doctrine, for example, was allowed
menting it that needed revision. All of the tlspects-credible detcr-
to stand almost unchallenged because of the balance of power
rence, collcctive security, and appropriate response-had to be
existing in Europe after Napoleon's defeat in 1815.
present. President Richard Nixon made good progress ill refining
The second phase of U.S. strategy, lill/ited illtcn'ellfiollislII,
the strategy to a viable doctrine before his resignation in 1974. All
emerged with thc victory in the Spanish-American \Var of 1898
subsequent presidents have adjusted U.S. strategy according to the
and lasted through the two world WiUS until 1948. The United States
basic guidelines proposed by the NL,{OIl Doctrine of the early 1970s.
revised its long-standing policy and begall to participate in world
There are seven Illajor principles of current U.S. strategy, all
aft~lirs. \Ve acquired territories overseas, while retaining our tradi-
descendent from the Nixon Doctrine. Each can be emphasized or
tional economic and political relationships with Europe. Our sea
powcr, spurred by ~'Iahan's writings, became our major military
force, showing the flag, protecting our commerce, and extending our
periphery of defcnse to the overseas territories. This reliance on thc
U.S. Navy as almost a "single weapons system" worked satisfactorily
in the Pacific. In Europe, howcver, the absence of a strong U.S. Army
presence to meet, in a timely manncr, the challenges of Germany
enabled that country to embroil the world in Iwo global wars.
The third strategy phase, called the COlltnillJl1ellt of COI1lIllI/-
lIiSI1I, bcgan with President Harry Truman's administration after
\"'orld \Var II, when the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union
ended and the Cold \Var started, with Communist nations show-
ing worrisome expansionist tendencies and supporting revolutions
in developing countries worldwide. It ended with the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 199 t. This
strategy evolved through two stilgCS: massive ret,lliatioll and flex-
ible response.
Massive retaliation. After the demobiliziltion of the U.S. military
following the end of\-Vorld \Var II, America had little left with which
to countcr Communist aggression except its monopoly in nuclear
weapons. It was the time when \-Vestern nations signed the major
Following the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, President
mutual dcfensc and collective security pacts such as NATO and George W. Bush formulated the Bush Doctrine, which asserted a right
OAS, mallY of which are still in effect today. The United States pro- of preemptive attack against terrorists and any countries harboring
them.