Page 133 - (DK) The Business Book
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                                                                          MAKING MONEY WORK          13 1
        See also: Profit before perks 124–25   ■  Who bears the risk? 138–45   ■  Profit versus   Jamsetji Tata
        cash flow 152–53   ■  Balancing long- versus short-termism 190–91
                                                                            Born on March 3, 1839 in
                                                                            South Gujarat, India, Jamsetji
                                         limited or no understanding of the
                                                                            Tata might have appeared an
                                         risks their company faced. This
                                                                            unlikely candidate to be the
                                         suggested a flaw in the ability of the   founder of a business that
                                         board to hold executives to account.  would grow to be one of the
                                            Most of the time, in most       largest conglomerates in the
                                         companies, executives make sound   world. Tata followed his
                                         decisions that require minimum     father—who had broken the
                                         scrutiny. However, good governance   family tradition of being a
                                         ensures that the board is always   Brahmin priest—into business
                                         alert—so it will be fully aware of   at 14 and soon showed
                                         what is happening when a mistake   potential, graduating from
                                         is made. Such a mistake might be   Elphinstone College in
        Companies that bury their heads   related to strategy (an overpriced   Mumbai in 1858. After
        in the sand—like the proverbial ostrich—  takeover bid, for example), or to    working for his father, Tata
        may be reluctant to be held accountable   the ethics of a particular situation.   took on his first enterprise—a
        for actions and decisions, with damaging   Independently minded nonexecutive   cotton mill—in 1868. One of
        consequences for business ethics.                                   his dreams was to found a
                                         directors should be in a prime
                                                                            steelworks, and although this
                                         position to question, for example,   business aim would not be
        of the business and its owners—  whether the company is right to    achieved in his lifetime, Tata
        the shareholders. Nonexecutive   be using very low-cost suppliers,    Iron and Steel Company was
        directors have an important role    or whether a contract has been    set up in 1907 by his son
        to play in corporate governance:   won using questionable means.    Dorabji. The steel industry
        they are not company employees                                      went on to be the foundation
        and should be able to quiz       When things go wrong               for Tata Group’s global success.
        executives with impunity.        The importance of good governance    One of Jamsetji Tata’s
                                         was made clear in the case of      overriding principles was
        Board-level scrutiny             Japan’s mighty Olympus camera      fairness, which permeated
                                                                            his entire business approach.
        In 2011, consultants McKinsey &   business in 2011. Newly appointed
                                                                            In terms of accountability, his
        Company published findings from    Chief Executive Michael Woodford
                                                                            vision was simple: “We started
        a survey of 1,597 board directors,   found that a $1.7 billion cover-up
                                                                            on sound and straightforward
        providing fascinating insights into   of losses had been made when
                                                                            business principles, considering
        the proceedings of board meetings.   acquiring other companies. The
                                                                            the interests of the
        The survey showed that in Asia,    Olympus directors had hidden     shareholders as our own.”
        no more than a third of a board’s   these losses from the published
        meeting time was spent scrutinizing  accounts and therefore from public
        management actions and decisions;  scrutiny. The board responded
        far longer was spent on strategic   by firing Woodford. Only after a
        planning. Although this sounded   successful campaign by Woodford
        sensible, it suggested that      did the Japanese authorities charge

        accountability and governance    key Olympus directors with fraud.
                                                                              Accountability breeds
        received less time. By contrast, in   Eventually the whole board
                                                                                 response-ability.
        North America nearly two-thirds of   resigned. The case demonstrated   Stephen R. Covey
        board time was spent on scrutiny.   how ineffective Olympus’s
                                                                          US management consultant (1932–2012)
           More surprisingly, the same   nonexecutive directors had been
        sample showed a lack of satisfaction   in holding the board to account,
        with fellow board members.       and how important good governance
        Directors thought that more than    and accountability are to the
        30 percent of their peers had    well-being of every company. ■
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