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26 Ibrahim Su an and Lee Tai De

factors that appear to underpin shifting allegiances and priorities among
Malay voters. At the onset, one discernible pattern was the di erence in party-
preference along generational lines. We discuss this dimension further below.
Overall, the results of GE14 showed some patterns rooted in pre-existing
party a liation and perhaps also in socio-political orientations among the
Malay electorate, which di ered along state and regional lines. As we noted
in reviewing surveys prior to the general election, Malay voters ranked their
6
preference rst for BN, followed by PAS, and only then PH. is situation
presented itself on 9 May 2018, but with regional variations.
GE14 results showed that Malay voters did not exhibit a national pattern,
as ethnic-Chinese and Indian voters did. Instead, there was a clear east-
west orientation within the peninsula: Malay voters in the east-coast states
of Kelantan, Terengganu, and to a lesser extent, Pahang, showed a higher
preference for PAS than PH. e same was the case in interior, Malay-
dominant, areas of Kedah, where PAS candidates gained a distinct majority
over BN and PH—allowing the Islamist party to secure a signi cant 15 seats
in the state assembly. In these areas, PH’s share of Malay votes was a paltry 9.2
per cent in Kelantan, 7.0 per cent in Terengganu, and 13.7 per cent in Pahang.
PH’s share of the Malay vote rarely exceeded one-third of the segment,
with the sometime exception of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur, where the highly
urbanised environment and strong presence of PH forces enabled the then-
opposition front to contest prevailing messages from BN and PAS (see Hew, this
volume). Overall, Malay support for PH could be clearly demarcated, allowing
the coalition to make gains in constituencies stretching from southern Kedah
to Johor Bahru in the south—where its support was in the range of 20–25
per cent. It should be noted that by leveraging superlative levels of non-Malay
support, PH was able to make gains in districts in which Malays comprised
under 70 per cent. In such areas, the split in Malay support between BN and
PAS allowed PH to win with just 20–30 per cent of Malay votes. In the east-
coast states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Pahang, in contrast, Malay support
was signi cantly lower, as noted above. Table 2.7 o ers details of Malay vote
shares for the main parties in Peninsular Malaysia.
While we were not able to extract voting estimates with much certainty for
Indian voters at the state level, due to constraints in the dataset, we were able
to analyse the ethnic-Chinese vote. Overall, we found that the level of Chinese
support for PH/PR increased by a further 10 per cent in 2018 compared to
2013. With the exception of Perlis (84.4 per cent), Pahang (86.5 per cent), and
Terengganu (86.5 per cent), we estimate that more than 90 per cent of Chinese
voters throughout Peninsular Malaysia voted for PH (see Table 2.8).

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